North Korean House of Cards

is not that it was tied to member of the Kim family, which is potentially destabilizing
in itself, but how it was publicized. Kim Jong-un and his supporters took a risk in
exposing weakness at the regime’s core by openly discussing Jang’s indictment in
such detail. This was followed by an unusually swift execution. On both counts, the
circumstantial evidence points to an internal power struggle—either between Kim
Jong-un and Jang, Jang and other power brokers, or likely both—that needed to be
quickly addressed. If this is the case, it is most likely that Kim Jong-un has not yet
consolidated his power and achieving this goal may have become more difficult. Not
only has Kim become the “Control Tower” before he was prepared to take on such
responsibility, but he is now also directly exposed to the power struggles that have
been churning within the regime since Kim Jong-il’s death. 160
Nevertheless, Jang’s high-profile purge likely froze the leadership in place
for the moment. The wider leadership was now concerned about what happens
next. The safest move would be to show unwavering loyalty to the Supreme Leader.
This created a period of stability as the remnants of Jang’s patronage network
were either neutralized or co-opted. The longer-term prognosis depends on Kim
Jong-un’s intrinsic leadership traits, as well as the system’s ability to move forward
with new faces at the fore. Provided that there has been no coup, as some suggest,
the concept of monolithic leadership rule should enforce stability at the center.
However, if policy failures begin to mount, Kim has left himself with little room
to maneuver. 161 He lacks the legitimacy his father possessed, let alone that of his
grandfather. 162 The Kim family itself has been wounded. If Kim Kyong-hui is
160 Alexandre Mansourov, “North Korea: Leadership Schisms and Consolidation During Kim
Jong-un’s Second Year in Power,” 38 North, January 22, 2014. According to Mansourov, the regent
structure around Kim Jong-un began to unravel not at the end of 2013, but in 2012 with the purge of Ri
Yong-ho. Jang’s purge was just the coup de grace of an already evolving process. If this is the case, much of
the reported North Korean political history from 2013 needs to be re-examined. It suggests the possibility
that Kim Jong-un is more adept at manipulating the levers of power than previously believed. Kim may
have taken measures beginning in early 2013 to marginalize Jang’s influence and power. This may have
been why Jang Song-taek was not one of the senior officials handling foreign and security policy at the
January 26, 2013 meeting, in which the third nuclear test was allegedly discussed. It could also explain
the sudden replacement of Ri Myong-su as Minister of People’s Security by Choe Pu-il, who is rumored
to be close to Kim Jong-un. Furthermore, it might shed light on the re-promotion in 2013 of generals
who had been demoted in 2012 (Choe Ryong-hae, Kim Kyok-sik, and Kim Yong-chol). In other words,
these occurrences may not have been random, but early indications of Jang’s diminishing clout at the
hands of his nephew.
161 The biggest weakness for Kim as he marks his fourth year as leader is that he has been unable
to accumulate startling achievements that would justify his position. “Quick wins” on the policy front are
critical for building his legitimacy.
162 “Does Aunt’s Absence Weaken Kim Jong-un?” The Chosun Ilbo, January 7, 2014. Kim Jongun
is not protected by former partisan soldiers like his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, and has been unable
to build a strong base of supporters like his father, Kim Jong-il, who was groomed for twenty years to
assume the throne.
Ken E. Gause
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