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North Korean House of Cards

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administrative. Kim Jong-il, a more reclusive leader, relied much more on his<br />

personal apparatus, while marginalizing many <strong>of</strong> the formal leadership bodies. The<br />

decision-making model under Kim Jong-un has evolved. It began as something<br />

that very much mimicked the Kim Il-sung model with a powerful regent structure<br />

attached for guidance and direction. Since the purge <strong>of</strong> Jang Song-taek, it appears<br />

that Kim Jong-un may begin to adopt a model closer to his father’s, which was<br />

firmly rooted in informal networks and personal lines <strong>of</strong> communications. As such,<br />

an understanding <strong>of</strong> the Kim Jong-il model will probably provide insights into the<br />

future <strong>of</strong> Kim Jong-un’s decision-making process.<br />

As noted above, the process most likely began in meetings with close<br />

aides or during the field guidance inspections. It was during these times that Kim<br />

Jong-il set the broad parameters for policy, both domestic and foreign. Once the<br />

broad outlines were set, policymaking was usually initiated by a direct request<br />

from Kim in the form <strong>of</strong> an instruction. Sometimes this instruction went to a<br />

particular department or even a particular individual. 374 On other occasions, the<br />

instruction was distributed to several relevant departments. Typically, more than<br />

one department was involved, and, in these cases, the instruction was managed<br />

through issue-related task forces that were organized to reach consensus. 375 In<br />

all circumstances, the KWP OGD made a note <strong>of</strong> Kim’s request so it could be<br />

tracked through the policymaking process.<br />

After sufficient consultation by relevant departments, a counselor or a task<br />

force <strong>of</strong> counselors would draft policy that addressed Kim Jong-il’s instruction. 376 It<br />

was then sent to Kim’s Personal Secretariat either as a document report (mun-geon<br />

bo-go) or a fax report (mo-sa bo-go). Reports submitted in document form included<br />

items less urgent, but still important for policy, such as proposals, direction <strong>of</strong><br />

374 For example, Kim Jong-il’s instructions given to the Ministry <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs were mostly<br />

in the form <strong>of</strong> “remarks addressed to the First Vice Foreign Minister.” In the past, Kang Sok-ju occupied<br />

this post. Now Kang is a Vice Premier, and it is unclear whether the current Foreign Minister Ri Su-yong<br />

or First Vice Foreign Minister, Kim Kye-gwan, plays this role.<br />

375 Author’s interviews in Seoul, April 2013. Issue-related task forces were set up for a range <strong>of</strong><br />

policy areas, such as inter-<strong>Korean</strong> relations and the economy.<br />

376 Author’s discussion with senior <strong>North</strong> <strong>Korean</strong> defectors residing in Seoul, April 2009. Every<br />

ministry and department throughout the government and Party has counselors. Under Kim Jong-il, these<br />

were usually people with close ties to Kim or his Personal Secretariat who had a clear understanding <strong>of</strong> his<br />

policy intentions. It was their job to draft correspondence between their ministry or department and the<br />

Kim apparatus.<br />

Committee for Human Rights in <strong>North</strong> Korea<br />

172

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