North Korean House of Cards

overseeing the implementation of the policy then registered it with the institution’s
records office and drew up a policy implementation plan. This plan laid out the
method of, relevant departments and ministries responsible for, and timeline for
implementation. The policy could then be monitored by the institution’s organization
department, which submitted progress reports to the KWP OGD. 381
5. The Future of the Personal Secretariat
Just as leadership dynamics are evolving in the post-Jang Song-taek era,
the purge has likely had an impact on North Korean decision-making and policy
formulation. If the speculation about Jang being the Control Tower is accurate,
from a policy perspective, his downfall probably created a huge void in the
day-to-day operations of the regime. According to some defector reporting, Jang
served a facilitating role by working with the various government and Party issue
groups dedicated to generating policy options. In addition to enforcing consensus
around policy options, Jang, as a senior policy advisor, was responsible for
explaining the options to Kim Jong-un. By having Jang serve as the Control Tower,
Kim was able to focus his attention more on the power consolidation process. 382
With Jang gone, Kim Jong-un will likely assume the role of Control Tower.
There was speculation in 2012 that Kim Jong-un’s Personal Secretariat had
begun to assume some of the administrative responsibilities of the Control Tower.
Reports surfaced that his Secretariat Office for Economic Affairs was developing
a roadmap that would best position the regime for securing its goal of becoming
a strong and prosperous nation by 2020. This included completing a study began
under Kim Jong-il to examine the implications of China’s economic revolution.
The Military Office was focused on designing a strategy for enhancing training in
the most cost-efficient manner. The External Affairs Office was tasked with writing
a report on a negotiating strategy to elicit South Korean economic support. 383
The little information available on the Personal Secretariat’s role during this
period suggests that it was working in parallel to Jang’s Control Tower responsibilities,
focusing more on long-term policy in addition to its day-to-day operations. As
such, it is plausible that with Jang’s downfall, Kim’s apparatus may bolster its policy
381 Ibid.
382 Policy consistency will be an early indicator of the success in this shift in the role of Control
Tower. The tension caused throughout the regime by Jang’s purge could lead to bureaucratic self-protection,
which could cause policy reversal or stagnation.
383 Hann Sung-Kwan, “North Korea, Getting Ready for Total Revolution and Opening in 2019,
What’s the Behind Story?,” NKSIS, June 7, 2012.
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