North Korean House of Cards

IX. SECTION ONE: NORTH KOREAN
LEADERSHIP DYNAMICS UNDER KIM JONG-UN
It has been nearly four years since Kim Jong-il died and his third son, Kim
Jong-un, assumed the reins of power in North Korea. Early in this power transition,
Kim Jong-un received the titles of Supreme Leader and Supreme Commander of
the armed forces. In April 2012, at the Fourth Party Conference and the subsequent
Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), he received the additional titles of power: First
Secretary of the KWP, Chairman of the KWP Central Military Commission (CMC),
and First Chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC). But even with
these titles of power, questions remain regarding Kim’s ability to run the regime and
the workings of the decision-making process within the North Korean leadership.
Since Kim Jong-un took power, his age and his capability to make decisions
and manage the regime have been subject to speculation. North Korean political
culture, which places extraordinary power in the hands of the Supreme Leader, has
been weighed against powerful individuals and institutions that reside in close
proximity to the young leader. Whether they have a decision-making role or simply
serve as consigliere is unclear.
This section examines the leadership dynamics surrounding Kim Jong-un’s
first three and a half years in power in an attempt to piece together the picture of how
the regime operates under the new leader. It consists of four chapters. The first chapter
begins with the mourning period and discusses the evolution of the leadership in
2012 and 2013. It ends with a discussion of the role and function of the regent
structure around Kim Jong-un. The second chapter is devoted to the narrative
surrounding the purge of Jang Song-taek. It provides background on the power
struggles and tensions that made Jang a threat to the regime. The third chapter
covers the changes in the leadership since Jang’s purge through the summer of 2015
and examines the key leaders around Kim Jong-un. The fourth chapter provides
some concluding thoughts.
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
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