North Korean House of Cards

KWP OGD, and the SSD, to construct a report justifying the need to remove Jang
Song-taek from power.
This report was much more thorough than the previous surveillance report
of March 2013 and delved deeply into Jang’s actions since returning to the
leadership in 2006. The primary investigation was conducted by the KWP OGD
under the direction of First Vice Directors Kim Kyong-ok and Jo Yon-jun, and Vice
Director Min Pyong-chol, 142 with support from the SSD. The report revealed Jang’s
efforts dating back to Kim Jong-il’s stroke in August 2008 to build a stronghold
of power throughout the regime, separate from that of the Supreme Leader. 143 This
process was somewhat hidden from Kim Jong-un because of the deterioration of the
surveillance apparatus inside the regime, most of which reported directly to Jang.
The investigation also found that Jang had fabricated documents and manipulated
evidence in order to remove his rivals, such as Ri Je-gang and Ri Yong-chol of the
KWP OGD. The report was submitted to Kim Jong-un in October 2013.
d. The Purge Unfolds
With this evidence and Kim Kyong-hui’s acquiesence, Kim Jong-un
entrusted his half-sister, Kim Sol-song, to develop the strategy for the purge in concert
with a special task force made up of Guard Command and SSD personnel. 144, 145 The
plan was to first go after Jang’s key lieutenants, Jang Su-gil and Ri Yong-ha. This
would remove an important support mechanism for Jang by cutting off his ties
within the KWP Administrative Department, the center of his growing empire.
As it would happen, Jang’s lieutenants had come to Kim Jong-un’s attention
in September 2013 for their role in a struggle for control over profits from North
142 Kim Jeong-U, “A Full Account of the Purge of Jang Song-taek,” Chosun Monthly, January
2014. One theory purports that the OGD’s investigation of Jang Song-taek began in December 2011,
soon after Kim Jong-il’s death.
143 The Politburo readout of December 8, 2013 notes, “Jang desperately worked to form a faction
within the Party by creating illusion about him and winning those weak in faith and flatterers to his
side.” Furthermore, he tried “to increase his force and build his base for realizing it by implanting those
who had been punished for their serious wrongs in the past period into ranks of officials of departments
of the Party Central Committee and units under them.” Jang also apparently sought to dismantle the
personality cult of the Kim dynasty and impede the Party’s campaign to build Kim Jong-un’s personality
cult, considering the Politburo accused him of “shunning and obstructing in every way the work for
holding President Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in high esteem for all ages.”
144 “Jang Song-thaek’s Purge was Expected a Long Ago,” NKSIS, December 10, 2013.
145 Lee Yun-Keol, “Kim Jong Un and His Brother Kim Jong Chol Picked Their Uncle Jang Song
Thaek as a ‘Prey’ to Maintain the ‘Kim Dynasty Regime’ in North Korea,” NKSIS, December 10, 2013.
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