North Korean House of Cards

A second rumor suggests that Jang’s actions were more self-driven and less
tied to a secret alliance with China. If he could deny the Kim family funds to Kim
Jong-un, the new leader would become more dependent on Jang and his considerable
resources. This would make Kim more pliable, allowing Jang to expand his
empire along with Kim Jong-un’s overall consolidation process. By the time Kim
was firmly established as the Supreme Leader, Jang would be the immovable power
behind the throne.
Regardless of the reason, Jang’s inability to secure the funds from the
Chinese banks allegedly raised suspicions about his loyalty towards the regime in the
eyes of Kim Kyong-hui and Kim Jong-un. Although Jang continued to be a visible
force within the regime, his actual power began to diminish from this point on. This
made him vulnerable to other forces inside the leadership that had been looking for
an opportunity to attack.
c. Jang under Investigation
Jang Song-taek’s influence and position within the regime was not something
he achieved in his own right, but came from the fact that he was the husband of Kim
Kyong-hui. He was consequently viewed as a “side branch” by members of the Kim
family and their key allies within the leadership. His ability to maneuver and thrive
within the regime depended on his wife’s support. While this support waxed and
waned over the years, Kim and Jang operated as a power couple. Their patronage
systems were linked but not intertwined. When Jang came under threat from
other elements within the regime, or was even purged, Kim Kyong-hui protected
him from permanent damage. This began to change in the fall of 2012.
In September, reports about Kim Kyong-hui’s health began to surface in
South Korean media. 133 Speculation increased after she did not attend a highly
unusual second session of the SPA, which convened at the end of September. 134 The
other two regents, Jang Song-taek and Choe Ryong-hae, were prominently featured,
making her absence even more noticeable.
According to information that has recently emerged from defector channels,
Kim Kyong-hui suffered a minor stroke around this time. 135 She was bedridden, but
North Korean economy using the Cabinet and government as a pivot, in order to stabilize Kim Jong-un’s
rule and maintain the current regime.
133 Kim Young-Jin, “N. Korean Leader’s Aunt in Ill Health,” The Korea Times, September 7, 2012.
134 “Kim Jong-un’s Aunt Seriously Ill,” The Chosun Ilbo, September 28, 2012.
135 There is debate over when this minor stroke occurred. Some sources claim it occurred in
early January 2013. If this is the case, she made a remarkable recovery, since she appeared at the Fourth
Meeting of Party Cell Secretaries held on January 29, 2013.
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
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