North Korean House of Cards

his right under the dictates of the Suryong system? 281 Or as some would argue, is he
being coerced by competing forces within the regime, such as the military?
What follows is an analysis of how decision-making appears to work in the
Kim Jong-un era. It examines what can be seen on the outside and speculates, based
on interviews of numerous defectors and experienced Pyongyang-watchers, how the
system has evolved since Kim Jong-il’s death. The shifting role of the Control Tower
acts as a breaking point between the way the system operated before and after the
purge of Jang Song-taek.
a. Glimpses into the Process
Kim Jong-il’s decision-making process took decades to develop and was
dependent on wide-ranging relationships across the regime. It was unlikely that Kim
Jong-un could have easily stepped into his father’s leadership model since it was so
dependent on Kim Jong-il’s personality and required profound inside knowledge of
regime politics, policies, and processes. He was only designated his father’s successor
in 2009. In other words, he had a handful of years to learn on the job, whereas
Kim Jong-il had nearly thirty years between the time he entered the Party apparatus
in the early 1960s and Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994. Yet, the regime went to great
lengths during Kim Jong-un’s first years in power to show him as the Supreme Leader
and ultimate decision maker.
In January 2012, North Korean media unveiled photographs of Kim
Jong-un’s signature and noted that he would continue his father’s practice of directly
reviewing and signing off on policy recommendations and other internal reports. 282
As the year came to a close, North Korean television broadcasted a documentary that
showed Kim Jong-un chairing a Politburo meeting in which he conveyed the news
of Kim Jong-il’s death. 283
281 Author’s interviews in Seoul, April 2013. The author was privy to an extraordinary debate
at the Korea Institute for National Unification that laid out the two leading theories on North Korean
decision-making.
282 Alex Melton and Jaesung Ryu, “Wanted: Handwriting Analyst,” North Korea: Witness to
Transformation, Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 5, 2012; “Kim Jong-un’s
Handwriting Shows Chip Off the Old Block,” The Chosun Ilbo, January 4, 2012. Photographs of Kim
Jong-un’s signature (attached to loyalty pledges from various institutions throughout the regime) appeared
for the first time in Nodong Sinmun on December 2, 2011. The regime probably decided to release the
photographs in order to show that Kim Jong-un was in control and was the ultimate decision-maker,
even if a collective group of advisors had significant input into the policy deliberation process. This was
not the first instance of North Korean media revealing the Supreme Leader’s signature. There were at least
100 cases dating back to 1981, when state media showed Kim Jong-il’s signature on internal reports.
283 Michael Madden, “Film Released to Mark 1 Year Anniversary of KJI’s Death,” North Korea
Leadership Watch, December 13, 2012. The Politburo scenes are in the fourth part of the documentary
Ken E. Gause
131