North Korean House of Cards

choreography of the transfer of power, including the grooming of the
heir apparent in the image of his grandfather, Kim Il-sung.
• Choe Tae-bok was Chairman of the SPA. He worked in education and
science, and was likely entrusted with technological development. After
Kim Jong-un was appointed as successor, North Korean media suddenly
began to highlight science and technology. They began praising Kim
Jong-un for fostering what it quaintly referred to as computerized
numerical control (CNC). This was the new leader’s own brand, in the
same way that Kim Il-sung had the “Self-Reliance” (Juche) doctrine and
Kim Jong-il had the “Military First” (Songun) policy.
The outer ring of this leadership configuration was apparently centered in the
KWP CMC, which was made up of key second- and third-generation military and
security officials from across the regime. Kim Jong-il’s reinvigoration of the CMC at
the Third Party Conference in 2010 had placed this body on par with the NDC in
terms of reach and influence. Pyongyang-watchers believed that the CMC would most
likely replace the NDC as the command post of “Military First” (Songun) politics
under Kim Jong-un. It would be responsible for crafting the “Great Successor’s” image,
garnering loyalty towards the new regime, and running the country. In terms of Kim’s
relationship with the military, three CMC members were particularly crucial during
the transition period. All three members accompanied Kim Jong-un as he escorted his
father’s hearse through the streets of Pyongyang:
• Vice Marshal Kim Yong-chun, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces,
oversaw the logistics and training of the military. Along with Jang
Song-taek, he would serve as a key conduit to the NDC. In addition,
he had past service in the KWP OGD and the KPA GPB, which gave
him invaluable experience in detecting potential disloyalty within the
armed forces. In this regard, his surveillance reportedly contributed to
foiling a coup attempt by the Sixth Corps in the mid-1990s. 14
14 The Sixth Corps incident refers to an attempted coup d’état by forces in North Hamgyong
Province in 1996. The coup plot was led by political committee members and included commanders of
battalions. The chief secretary of North Hamgyong Province, administrative cadres, vice directors of the
provincial SSD, and other cadres were implicated. The group was apparently planning to start an uprising
in North Hamgyong Province first and then head for Pyongyang. However, the plan was discovered by
the MSC (with support from Kim Yong-chun, who helped oversee the dismantlement of the corps) and
the ringleaders were rounded up. According to some sources, around forty were executed and a further
300 severely punished.
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
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