North Korean House of Cards

SSD carries out a wide range of counterintelligence and internal security functions
normally associated with the secret police. It is responsible for finding anti-state
criminals—those accused of anti-government and dissident activities, economic
crimes, and disloyalty to the political leadership. In addition, it runs political
prisons and has counter-intelligence and intelligence collection responsibilities. It
monitors political attitudes and maintains surveillance on people who have returned
from foreign countries. Department personnel escort high-ranking officials, guard
national borders, and monitor international entry points. 589 The degree of fear it
instills in the political security bureaus of the KPA, which have representatives at
all levels of command, is uncertain. However, it occasionally takes actions against
members of the elite.
Image 40: SSD Main Complex in Pyongyang
(Source: Google Earth as published on North Korea Economy Watch)
In the past, SSD agents were assigned to military units and placed under the
control of the unit’s Party committee. Since the elevation of the MSC in the 1990s,
this no longer seems to be the case. 590 North Korea’s unique internal security system
has layers of competing and conflicting responsibilities. SSD agents sometimes
589 “Who Is in Charge of N.Korea’s Nuclear Weapons?” The Chosun Ilbo, December 26, 2011.
According to South Korean reports, the SSD and MSC are also responsible for security at sensitive
defense facilities, such as the Yongbyon uranium enrichment facility.
590 Lee Seok-Young, “Officer Families Just Like the Rest,” Daily NK, December 2, 2011. It
should be noted, however, that the SSD occasionally takes part in cases involving the military. For
example, according to a source in Ryanggang Province, a number of wives of army officers from the
Tenth Corps reservist training base in Bocheon County were intending to smuggle some metals out of
the country to buy food. When they were caught, officials at the base turned to the SSD in an effort
to quietly handle the matter. However, friction between the SSD and the MSC led to a turf battle that
generated a “No. 1 Report” that went directly to Kim Jong-il’s office. Kim decided to let the MSC
resolve the matter.
Ken E. Gause
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