North Korean House of Cards

he played this role. 124 To ensure that Kim was informed he received reports from all
sectors of the regime, including the Party, military, and security services. 125 Jang
received these reports first with the possible exception of military reports. He was
allegedly allowed to provide comment on them and even work with Kim Jong-un’s
Personal Secretariat to prioritize them. 126 Whenever the Supreme Leader’s decision
was needed to embark on a new policy line or to resolve conflicting policy options,
Jang Song-taek presumably advised his nephew on the courses of action and helped
him through the decision-making process. According to numerous sources, the
Supreme Leader’s reporting and approval systems were still in place. This would
suggest that all documents carried Kim Jong-un’s, not Jang Song-taek’s, signature—a
127, 128
vital practice to ensure the legitimacy of the “Leader” (Suryong) system.
3. Jang Song-taek’s Fall from Grace
By early 2013, rumors spread that Jang Song-taek’s influence was waning.
He was no longer as visible as he had been the year before. As noted earlier, the
number of times he accompanied Kim Jong-un on guidance inspections began to
decrease. Still, he did not appear in imminent danger. According to several sources
from inside the regime, Jang’s power was much more precarious behind the scenes.
While he remained part of the inner circle around Kim Jong-un, his activities came
under scrutiny in light of a warning that Kim Jong-il had alluded to in his will.
124 Park Hyeong-Jung, “One Year into the ‘6.28 Policy Directives’: Contents and Progress,” Korea
Institute for National Unification: Online Series 13, No. 18 (28 June 2013). However, there were some
indications that Kim Jong-un occasionally established special working groups to provide advice and
options on matters of policy, perhaps through Jang Song-taek. In the days after Kim Jong-il’s death, it was
rumored that Kim Jong-un instructed the Cabinet to establish a “study group to prepare for reforms in
the economic management method.” This group produced recommendations and policy directives that
would set the foundation for the June 28 policy directives.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid. According to one source, “Jang Song-taek shares major documents that are reported
to Kim Jong-un and appears to be deeply involved in major policy decisions, advising Kim on all state
affairs.” This most likely reflected his dual role as a senior regent to Kim Jong-un and the “Control Tower.”
“N. Korea’s Eminence Grise at Ease in Power,” The Chosun Ilbo, op. cit.
127 Author’s interviews in Seoul, April 2013.
128 Please see Section Two of this paper for a description of the “Leader” (Suryong) system.
Ken E. Gause
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