North Korean House of Cards

. Kim Jong-un’s Role as Decision Maker
The Supreme Leader’s role as decision maker consists of two levels: strategic
and operational. At the strategic level, he is the sole decision maker responsible for
setting the overarching guidance that frames the entire policymaking process. At the
operational level, the Supreme Leader acts as the Control Tower, making day-to-day
decisions that fit within this overarching guidance.
For Kim Jong-un, this linkage between the Supreme Leader and the Control
Tower was separated, presumably on Kim Jong-il’s orders. As mentioned earlier,
Jang Song-taek acted as the Control Tower during the first two years of the Kim
Jong-un era. Jang worked with Kim to manage the day-to-day affairs of the regime.
If changes were necessary on the strategic level, Kim Jong-un most likely met with
one or more of his regents. They could provide context and make him aware of the
consequences of various courses of action.
Since Jang’s downfall, the role of Control Tower has presumably been
restored to the Supreme Leader. If so, Kim Jong-un would have to play a greater
micro-managerial role. This restores the natural order to the regime’s chain of
command, but raises questions about how Kim has positioned himself to assume
this operational role. The answer most likely lies in a combination of the expansion
of his personal leadership apparatus and the infrastructure that was put in place to
educate him on the policy process.
One of the questions that frequently arises when discussing the transfer of
power to Kim Jong-un is how he was trained to step into the shoes of the Supreme
Leader. Since his formal designation as heir apparent in September 2010, North
Korean media began to report on Kim Jong-un’s guidance inspections with his father,
something that apparently began even before he became the designated successor. Is
this the only method by which he learned about the situation throughout the regime
and how policies are affecting various groups and the lives of ordinary people?
Recent defector reporting suggests that this is not the case. There is an institutional
process that has been designed to both inform Kim Jong-un and prepare him for the
significant responsibilities of a job that demands micro-management.
According to one well-informed source with contacts inside North Korea,
immediately following Kim Jong-il’s death, Kim Jong-un began to hold weekly
meetings on Tuesday and Friday afternoons. These meetings were attended by top
officials from across the regime, including the Party, government, and military. 293
293 Author’s interview in Seoul, April 2013. See also Cheong Seong-Chang, “Process for
Policymaking Regarding National Security,” op. cit. These meetings appear to be a modified continuation
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
138