North Korean House of Cards

4. Civil-Military Relations by Mid-2013
By mid-2013, Kim Jong-un’s control over the military was still debatable. 74
He oversaw a reorganization of the high command that appeared to unfold in two
stages. In 2012, officers seen as obstructive or more loyal to Kim Jong-il than to
Kim Jong-un were replaced. This was followed in 2013 by reappointments to critical
positions, as well as continuing to bring officers with allegiance to Kim Jong-un
into the high command. These moves challenged rumors about Kim Jong-un being
controlled by the military, especially in the wake of the March/April crisis. Moreover,
there were no overt signs of disloyalty within the high command.
The removal of members of the high command and appointments of
relatively unknown and politically weak officers seemed to bolster the power of the
GPB, which is responsible for ensuring the high command’s loyalty to the Party and
Supreme Leader. 75 Appointing trusted aides, such as Kim Kyok-sik, would not only
ensure a politically astute command and control mechanism over operational forces, 76
but would also allow Kim Jong-un to build relationships with the second- and
third-level members of the officer corps, with the GSD’s assistance. This was critical
because if Kim Jong-un were ever to fully assume the role of Supreme Leader, he
would need the unwavering support of the military. 77
74 There are several patronage systems that make up the high command. These systems are
headed by officers close to the Kim family. At the beginning of the Kim Jong-un regime, the major
patronage systems were tied to O Kuk-ryol, Hyon Chol-hae, Ri Yong-mu, and, to a lesser extent, Ri
Yong-ho. Before his purge, some argued that Jang Song-taek, vis-à-vis his late brothers who were military
officers, also had a patronage system. If this speculation was true, Kim Jong-un, perhaps with Jang
Song-taek’s support, may have dismantled the patronage systems tied to Hyon Chol-hae and Ri Yongho.
Ri Yong-mu has been retired in place for years, and his patronage system may have diminshed. The
important question is whether O Kuk-ryol has been marginalized or remains a critical player inside the
regime. The South Korean Pyongyang-watching community is sharply divided on this issue.
75 Cheong Seong-Chang, DPRK Leadership Under Kim Jong-un (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 2012).
According to several sources, Kim Jong-un and his advisors were thrown off balance by the blowback
from the purge of Ri Yong-ho. This accounts for the lack of follow-through with the June Economic
Measures in 2012 and the spike in references to the “Military First” (Songun) in North Korean media.
76 While Kim Kyok-sik disappeared from public view, it is likely that he continued to wield
influence from the shadows.
77 Stephan Haggard, “Military Promotions in the DPRK,” North Korea: Witness to Transformation,
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 13, 2013. This blog entry command and control
chart showing the trends of major military promotions from 1997 to 2013. Since 2010, when the regime
began to lay the foundation for the Kim Jong-un succession, there had been 206 major military promotions.
Since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2012 (up to August 2013), there had been 148 major promotions.
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
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