North Korean House of Cards

as the Supreme Leader, but his ability to dictate the course of the regime will be
compromised. He will have to negotiate with other powerful elements in the regime.
The notion of Kim family rule will become a ruse used to justify the regime, not the
driving force behind the regime.
Section Two of this book has focused on the parts of Kim Jong-un’s apparatus
that are most critical to his success or failure as a third-generation Supreme Leader:
the Leader’s Personal Secretariat, the Royal Economy, and the internal security
apparatus. They were highlighted not only because of their inherent importance to
the North Korean regime and how it operates, but also because they are important to
the success of any totalitarian regime. These three elements are intertwined. If any one
of these elements fails, it will place increasing strain on the others. If any one of these
elements becomes corrupt and goes beyond the control of the Leader, it will severely
compromise his ability to rule.
At the beginning of Kim Jong-un’s rule, his apparatus of power was weak
and unstructured. Some parts of it were tied to him, but many parts were tied to
his father and other individuals within the system. His Personal Secretariat was, and
is, still being formed as some of his critical aides moved over from Kim Jong-il’s
own apparatus. The Royal Economy had been passed to Kim Jong-un in his father’s
will, but various assets and hard currency operations were beyond his control.
The internal security apparatus lacked any handpicked leaders by the new Supreme
Leader, and its formal chains of command largely passed through the hands of
Jang Song-taek. Even Kim Jong-un’s ability to make decisions was a highly scripted
process controlled by a regent network that kept him inside a protective circle
isolated from the larger leadership.
The purge of Jang Song-taek can easily be understood in this context. It was,
in many respects, a decisive maneuver that allowed Kim Jong-un to take a major step
forward. By purging his uncle, Kim removed a nexus of control that was metastasizing
across hard currency operations and beginning to constrain the efficacy of the Royal
Economy. In turn, this allowed Kim’s Personal Secretariat to grow and become firmly
established as a control mechanism for distributing largess throughout the regime. It
also provided Kim with assets and access to hard currency that allowed him to secure
loyalty at the highest levels of power. Unlike the military, which Kim has reshuffled
with impunity, the internal security apparatus was not so easily bent to his will. Jang’s
purge placed him in direct control of this apparatus, and a more streamlined Royal
Economy most likely eased this process.
Nevertheless, the purge of Jang Song-taek is only a temporary tactical
maneuver. It does not solve the larger systemic problems the regime is facing. While
Kim Jong-un’s apparatus may be able to maintain regime stability in the near term,
Ken E. Gause
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