HRM textbook

APPENDIX B 653
The Baker panel looked at BP s corporate safety oversight, the corporate safety culture,
and the process safety management systems at BP at the Texas City plant as well at BP s
other refineries.
Basically, the Baker panel concluded that BP had not provided effective safety
process leadership and had not established safety as a core value at the five refineries
it looked at (including Texas City).
Like the CSB, the Baker panel found that BP had emphasized personal safety in
recent years and had in fact improved personal safety performance, but had not
emphasized the overall safety process, thereby mistakenly interpreting improving
personal injury rates as an indication of acceptable process safety performance at its
U.S. refineries. In fact, the Baker panel went on, by focusing on these somewhat
misleading improving personal injury rates, BP created a false sense of confidence that
it was properly addressing process safety risks. It also found that the safety culture at
Texas City did not have the positive, trusting, open environment that a proper safety
culture required. The Baker panel s other findings included the following.
BP did not always ensure that adequate resources were effectively allocated
to support or sustain a high level of process safety performance.
BP s refinery personnel are overloaded by corporate initiatives.
Operators and maintenance personnel work high rates of overtime.
BP tended to have a short-term focus and its decentralized management system
and entrepreneurial culture delegated substantial discretion to refinery plant
managers without clearly defining process safety expectations, responsibilities,
or accountabilities.
There was no common, unifying process safety culture among the five refineries.
The company s corporate safety management system did not make sure there
was timely compliance with internal process safety standards and programs.
BP s executive management either did not receive refinery-specific information
that showed that process safety deficiencies existed at some of the plants, or did
not effectively respond to any information it did receive. 1
The Baker panel made several safety recommendations for BP, including the following.
1. The company s corporate management must provide leadership on process
safety.
2. The company should establish a process safety management system that identifies,
reduces, and manages the process safety risks of the refineries.
3. The company should make sure its employees have an appropriate level of
process safety knowledge and expertise.
4. The company should involve relevant stakeholders in developing a positive,
trusting, and open process safety culture at each refinery.
5. BP should clearly define expectations and strengthen accountability for process
safety performance.
6. BP should better coordinate its process safety support for the refining line
organization.
7. BP should develop an integrated set of leading and lagging performance indicators
for effectively monitoring process safety performance.
8. BP should establish and implement an effective system to audit process safety
performance.
9. The company s board should monitor the implementation of the panel s
recommendations and the ongoing process safety performance of the refineries.
10. BP should transform into a recognized industry leader in process safety
management.
1 These findings and the following suggestions based on BP Safety Report Finds Company s Process Safety
Culture Ineffective, Global Refining & Fuels Report, January 17, 2007.