HRM textbook

654 APPENDIX B
In making its recommendations, the panel singled out the company s chief executive
at the time, Lord Browne, by saying, In hindsight, the panel believes if Browne had
demonstrated comparable leadership on and commitment to process safety [as he did
for responding to climate change] that would have resulted in a higher level of safety
at refineries.
Overall, the Baker panel found that BP s top management had not provided
effective leadership on safety. It found that the failings went to the very top of the
organization, to the company s chief executive, and to several of his top lieutenants.
The Baker panel emphasized the importance of top management commitment,
saying, for instance, that it is imperative that BP leadership set the process safety tone
at the top of the organization and establish appropriate expectations regarding
process safety performance. It also said BP has not provided effective leadership in
making certain its management and U.S. refining workforce understand what is
expected of them regarding process safety performance.
Lord Browne, the chief executive, stepped down about a year after the explosion.
About the same time, some BP shareholders were calling for the company s executives
and board directors to have their bonuses more closely tied to the company s safety
and environmental performance in the wake of Texas City. In October 2009, OSHA
announced it was filing the largest fine in its history for this accident, for $87 million,
against BP. One year later, BP s Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico exploded,
taking 11 lives.
Questions
1. The textbook defines ethics as the principles of conduct governing an individual or a
group, and specifically as the standards one uses to decide what their conduct should be.
To what extent do you believe that what happened at BP is as much a breakdown in the
company s ethical systems as it is in its safety systems, and how would you defend your
conclusion?
2. Are the Occupational Safety and Health Administrations standards, policies, and rules
aimed at addressing problems like the ones that apparently existed at the Texas City plant?
If so, how would you explain the fact that problems like these could have continued for so
many years?
3. Since there were apparently at least three deaths in the year prior to the major explosion,
and an average of about one employee death per 16 months for the previous 10 years, how
would you account for the fact that mandatory OSHA inspections missed these glaring
sources of potential catastrophic events?
4. The textbook lists numerous suggestions for how to prevent accidents. Based on what
you know about the Texas City explosion, what do you say Texas City tells you about the
most important three steps an employer can take to prevent accidents?
5. Based on what you learned in Chapter 16(Safety), would you make any additional recommendations
to BP over and above those recommendations made by the Baker panel and
the CSB? If so, what would those recommendations be?
6. Explain specifically how strategic human resource management at BP seems to have supported
the company s broader strategic aims. What does this say about the advisability of
always linking human resource strategy to a company s strategic aims?
Source notes for BP Texas City: Sheila McNulty, BP Knew of Safety Problems, Says Report, The Financial Times,
October 31, 2006, p. 1; CBS: Documents Show BP Was Aware of Texas City Safety Problems, World Refining & Fuels
Today, October 30, 2006; BP Safety Report Finds Company s Process Safety Culture Ineffective, Global Refining &
Fuels Report, January 17, 2007; BP Safety Record Under Attack, Europe Intelligence Wire, January 17, 2007; Mark
Hofmann, BP Slammed for Poor Leadership on Safety, Oil Firm Agrees to Act on Review Panel s Recommendations,
Business Intelligence, January 22, 2007, p. 3; Call for Bonuses to Include Link with Safety Performance, The Guardian,
January 18, 2007, p. 24; www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=9005029&contentId=7015905, accessed July 12,
2009; Steven Greenhouse, BP Faces Record Fine For 05 Blast, The New York Times, October 30, 2009, pp. 1, 6. Kyle
W Morrison,, Blame to go around, Safety & Health v. 183 no. 3 (March 2011) p. 40.