Hazard anticipation of young novice drivers - SWOV
Hazard anticipation of young novice drivers - SWOV
Hazard anticipation of young novice drivers - SWOV
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when they occur infrequently in time and space. This can be sudden sounds,<br />
a flash <strong>of</strong> light or something with a bright colour in a grey environment.<br />
Objects or events can also be instinctively salient (e.g. something with the<br />
shape <strong>of</strong> a snake) or can have become salient by learning. The well learned<br />
salient stimuli can be the content aspects and the context aspects <strong>of</strong> the road<br />
and traffic situations experienced <strong>drivers</strong> perceive and <strong>of</strong> which based on gut<br />
feeling, they immediately 'know' there is a latent hazard (see Section 3.8.1).<br />
This subconscious knowledge is stored in neural representations (schemata).<br />
Activation <strong>of</strong> neural representations (schemata) is not only the result <strong>of</strong><br />
stimuli in the road and traffic situation, but also the result <strong>of</strong> knowledge<br />
stored in long term memory, feelings (internal state <strong>of</strong> the driver), the actions<br />
she or he can take (motor) and information from other senses than the eye<br />
(sensory). In terms <strong>of</strong> the theory presented in Chapter 3, the bottom-up<br />
process <strong>of</strong> salience filtering can be seen as an element <strong>of</strong> contention<br />
scheduling (the autonomous process <strong>of</strong> activation and inhibition <strong>of</strong><br />
supporting and conflicting schemata) and the neural representations as the<br />
activated schemata at a particular moment in time. Note that bottom-up<br />
salience filtering in Knudsen's functional model <strong>of</strong> attention is not synonym<br />
with bottom-up fixations. A top-down fixation (e.g. when a driver looks in a<br />
direction where nothing can be seen, but something is expected) can be the<br />
result <strong>of</strong> bottom-up salience filtering for experienced <strong>drivers</strong>. The neural<br />
representations (or activated schemata) are not only determined by salience<br />
filtering, but also by sensitivity control. This is the process <strong>of</strong> the energizing<br />
<strong>of</strong> certain schemata <strong>of</strong> the group <strong>of</strong> schemata that already have been selected<br />
by the salience filters, comparable with what SAS does in Norman &<br />
Shallice's model on willed and automatic control <strong>of</strong> behaviour (1986). The<br />
black arrows in Figure 4.1 represent top-down attention and the grey arrows<br />
bottom-up attention. The third process in Knudsen's functional model <strong>of</strong><br />
attention is 'competitive selection'. This means that signal strengths <strong>of</strong><br />
activated neural representations (schemata) are compared. The weighing <strong>of</strong><br />
the signal strengths <strong>of</strong> neural representations (schemata) leads to the<br />
selection <strong>of</strong> a dominant neural representation (dominant schema). Note that<br />
the dominant neural representation does not have to be processed in<br />
working memory in order to elicit an eye movement. If for instance in case <strong>of</strong><br />
driving, the selected dominant schema is about a routine hazard (for an<br />
experienced driver), gaze control will be bottom-up. This is represented in<br />
Figure 4.1 by the gray arrow from 'competitive selection' to 'gaze control'.<br />
When information is not processed in working memory, the attentional<br />
processes remain in the realm <strong>of</strong> the contention scheduler. Also note that in<br />
the bottom-up process new schemata can be energized (sensitivity control)<br />
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