Hazard anticipation of young novice drivers - SWOV

inhibition of anticipatory mental representations, i.e. schemata. In both the
model of Norman & Shallice (1986) and in the framework of Brouwer &
Schmidt (2002), attention is seen as the immediate cause of task performance.
However, unlike Norman & Shallice (1986), Brouwer (2002) does not
consider attention as a prerogative of the SAS only. Triggered by context and
content aspects schemata unfold as patterns of selective attention. Attention
both is present in bottom-up processes in the contention scheduler and in
top-down processes. It is possible to be attentive as a driver and to anticipate
hazards without conscious awareness of these hazards. In this way in
familiar driving situations, even if they are complex, persons with mild
dementia can cope with these situations and anticipate the hazards in these
situations. In Section 4.1.6 a model of attention and eye movements is
presented in which four attentional processes are distinguished. These
processes are: processing information in working memory, top-down
sensitivity control, competitive selection and automatic bottom-up filtering
of salient stimuli. This model explains how anticipatory eye movements are
possible without conscious awareness of hazards. This is to say possible
hazards that are not processed in working memory.
Groeger (2000) has described how schemata and attention could work
in driving. These descriptions are based on a theory about the working of the
SAS that was developed by Stuss et al. (1995). According to Stuss et al. (1995)
the SAS can not only energize and inhibit schemata in the CS, the SAS can
also make adjustments in contention scheduling, monitor schema activity
and carry out logical operations with regard to the connection between
activated and inhibited schemata at a particular moment in time (i.e. if this
schema is activated then that schema has to be inhibited). By doing so it can
sustain attention, concentrate attention, share attention between different tasks,
suppress the execution of task elicited by the CS, switch attention, prepare for
attention in case of an intended action in the future (prospective memory)
and set a script (e.g. driving along a motorway). In this thesis as is assumed
by Brouwer (2002), attention is inextricably connected with processes around
schema selection and attention is not limited to the functioning of the SAS
only. For Norman & Shallice (1986) and Stuss et al. (1995) attention can only
be top-down. This however does not alter the here below presented
examples about schemata, attention and driving Groeger (2000) has made
based on the model developed by Stuss et al. (1995). The examples are:
• A driver sustains attention by keeping the schemata activated for events
that occur only occasionally. Hazard anticipation requires the
permanent activation of schemata for rare events. Occasionally drivers
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