The Future of Smallholder Farming in Eastern Africa - Uganda ...

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N=Number of households reporting. The figures add up to more than 100% because some respondents had more than one plot of land. Table 5. Correlation between adequacy of irrigation water received on rice plot and yield Adequacy of irrigation water received Correlation with rice yield First season (N=614)# Second season (N=589)# Received adequate water throughout the season 0.098** 0.091** Received adequate water part of the season and -0.036 0.005 inadequate water the other part Received inadequate water throughout the season -0.046 -0.039 Received inadequate water part of the season and - -0.022 no water at all for the other part #N=Total number of plots used in the analysis **=Correlation is significant at 5% level of significance Table 6. Rice yields and payment of irrigation fees Season First season 1474.6 (31.25) N=614 Second season 1570.8 (32.78) Average Yield (Kgs/Acre) All Plots Category 1 Category II Category III 1394.3 ab 1387.9 a 1516.2 b (148.9) (62.4) (36.5) N=15 N=185 N=414 1562.7 ab (86.1) N=34 1445.9 a (57.3) N=187 N=589 N=Total number of plots used in the analysis. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors Different superscripts mean statistically significant differences across categories. 1634.9 b (42.6) N=368 Table 7. Reasons Given by farmers for not paying irrigation fees Reason % Households reporting First season Second season Received inadequate or no water at all. 13.3 16.7 Service for which fee was collected was not 11.1 5.6 provided in previous season. Did not have enough money 22.2 15.1 Irrigation fee was not collected from the 15.6 15.1 farmers Belief that had to pay in only one season 13.3 17.5 Had poor or no rice harvest at all 2.2 7.1 Had not yet harvested (pays after harvesting) 2.2 8.7 * In this particular case N exceeds the actual number of farmers/households that didn’t pay irrigation fees because some respondents gave more than one reason for not paying irrigation fee. There is a bylaw against non-payment of irrigation fees and defaulters lose their plots in the following season. 45 percent of the farmers ranked the fee collection procedure as
unsatisfactory (Table 8). Flaws in the collection methods could be a reason why some farmers failed to pay their fees. But it was also evident that only about one-quarter of the farmers understood the correct interpretation and penalty of the fee-payment bylaw, a fact that could influence compliance (Table 9). There is a need therefore, for more education to make sure everybody understands the bylaw. Table 8. Farmers’ perception/ranking of the irrigation fee collection procedure Ranking % Households reporting First season Second season Very well 1.6 1.0 Well 53.9 50.9 Fairly well 27.6 31.1 Poor 15.3 14.9 Very poor 1.6 2.1 Nkonya et al. (2001) observed that it is difficult to effectively enforce bylaws and restrictions that are not clear to farmers. Besides, poor and selective enforcement of the bylaw, evident in Table 10, perpetuates non-compliance. Three-quarters of the farmers rated the current DRS administration poor to fair, mainly as a result of poor maintenance of irrigation facilities and corruption (Table 11 and Table 12). These administrative weaknesses result in inadequate fee collection, irrigation canals not being de-silted well, less water supply, poor rice harvests and a vicious cycle between reduced irrigation water and non-payment of fees. Without a guarantee of adequate irrigation water supply, it may be difficult to enforce the fee payment. Hence, there is need to rehabilitate the entire irrigation system and institute proper management procedures before handing it to the farmers. Table 9. Farmers’ knowledge/awareness of penalty for non-payment of the irrigation fees Perception % Households (N=360) Plot withdrawn from defaulter for two seasons 56.7 Plot withdrawn from defaulter for one season 25.0 Plot withdrawn for unspecified period 13.1 Defaulter is fined Ushs 2000 1.7 Defaulter fined Ushs 1000 0.8 No penalty 0.3 Defaulter is given warning 0.8 Plot withdrawn for three seasons 0.6 Plot withdrawn for ever 0.6 Plot withdrawn till farmer complies 0.6 Table 10. Categories of defaulters that usually go unpunished Defaulter category % Households reporting (N = 112) Relatives of enforcers 28.6 Friends of enforcers 33.0
Page 1 and 2:
Part One - Agricultural Productivit
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I. Introduction Agricultural Produc
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came about from expansion of cultiv
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study, therefore, limited itself to
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Land allocation and yields of 12 cr
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Table 6: Key economic variables for
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local seed in absolute terms and th
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Table 11: Crosscutting priority con
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Table 13: General constraints to ma
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These results clearly demonstrate t
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Table 18: Crosscutting constraints
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V. Policy Implications The findings
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References Appleton, Simon (2001).
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1.0 BACKGROUND 1.1 Introduction Low
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egins with a summary of the literat
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Source: National Wetlands Conservat
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shillings (§37-38). Every landowne
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Similarly, Howard (1995) used socia
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Uganda may well have more than a qu
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factors that explain household leve
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of inputs 18 , pests and diseases,
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(PMA p. 27). It also requires impro
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agriculturalists, who still do not
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to have covered 30,000 ha. During t
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4.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY The breadt
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• What is the current extent of w
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Figure 2. Changes in Sources of Com
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Figure 5. Proportion of Households
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estimates are remarkably consistent
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FSI - Percentage by District Distri
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was corrected using the White-Huber
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utilization for the household. Howe
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The nature of the structures to con
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impact of irrigation on horticultur
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growing population. Wetland protect
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APPENDICES Appendix 1. The Wetlands
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Appendix 2. THE 5V’s PRIORITY CLA
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Appendix 5. Determinants of Product
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Estimated covariances = 79 Number o
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International Food Policy Research
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Scherr, Sara J., 1999b. Poverty-env
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Land Tenure, Agricultural Productiv
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1.3 Statement of the problem Land s
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In order to achieve these objective
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densely populated Nyeri and Kakameg
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Figure 3: Conceptual Model Type of
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Figure 4: Location of the Study Dis
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By 2001, land demarcation and regis
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3.4 Survey Design The survey was un
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3.5.3 Model of Environmental Degrad
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questionnaire (Figure 8). Prominent
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Figure 10: Availability of hired la
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Figure 13 shows the level of cultiv
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joint significance test on the 4 dr
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Table 8: Regression Results on Maiz
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was classified into three categorie
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Table 9: Tobit Analysis with Enviro
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5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICAT
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5.5 Access to Market A number of fa
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FAO (2003b). “Women and Food Secu
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Omiti John and Paul Obunde (2002).
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Annex 1: Pearson Correlation Coeffi
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SEXHH SEXLUSER TSECUR VEGCP1 CHILDE
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Part two - Agricultural Markets
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Market Liberalisation and Agricultu
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farms show annual fluctuations, wit
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Figure 2: Recent trends in domestic
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5. The Model The interest of this s
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sources for each sector. α IM ji a
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Savings Households’ savings are a
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The value-added price is defined th
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Specifically, the Government polici
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Table 5: Calculated Tariff Rates (%
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disincentive to farmers. Inability
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competitiveness. The second one is
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Table 7: Wage Rates and Labour Inco
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Similar simulation is undertaken in
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References Block, S. and C.P. Timme
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Tyler, G. J. and Akinboade, O. 1992
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(A.10) ai ∑ P ϖ P i=1,...,3; j =
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(A.32) price (A.33) P Q = P ( 1+ td
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Table A.2: Variables of KEGEM Varia
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VA A i Efficiency parameter in valu
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CHAPTER FIVE Post-Liberalization Ma
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As alluded to earlier, initial agri
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directly to dairy farmers as animal
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to engage in this new role, the gov
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2.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 2.1 Overal
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markets with minor gaps in data ser
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Price-series correlations are conve
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Migori Awendo Postliberalization 1,
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model depends on whether or not the
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Table 6b--Unit root tests for price
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Table 8a--Unit root tests for OLS r
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3.3 The Role of Infrastructure and
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Table 13--Reported distances from t
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Table 15--Reported maize storage pr
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Table 17--Traders’ perception of
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3.3.6.2 Awareness of the Liberaliza
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Retailer (open-air market) 21 13 7
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3.4 Maize Marketing Costs Traders w
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3.4.4 License and Market Fees Accor
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5.Develop farmers’ and traders’
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Coulter, J., and J. A. F. Compton.
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Meilink, A. H. 1987. Food consumpti
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Figure 1 Maize surplus and deficit
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Figure 3 Trends in Maize Prices 199
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Price per 90kg bag (Kshs) Mbeere Di
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Figure 4 Modes of transporting maiz
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Figure 6: Limitations to storage ca
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Figure 8: Problems experienced in a
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CHAPTER SIX Grain Marketing in Addi
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A third, related explanation argues
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educed marketing costs related to p
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1.4. Research questions This study
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1.6. Organization of the report Thi
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the cases, respectively (Table 2.4)
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Brokers believe that most regional
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There is also a close relationship
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Table 2.14: Buyers’ methods for i
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Source: Survey, 2002. Table 2.18: D
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Table 2.22: Method used to grade di
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Table 2.25: Access to credit broker
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It has been reported that grain pur
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3. GRAIN RETAILERS Retailers serve
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Like brokers, retailers use cash or
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Table 3.11: Buyers’ information a
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Table 3.14: Retailers’ views of g
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Getting reliable price information
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Table 4.4: How do you set a sales p
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Table 4.7: Means of settling disput
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a.m. The survey included wholesale
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Table 5.3: Instability index of dai
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Table 5.7: Seasonality index of who
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Figure 5.3: Ratio of wholesale to r
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Table 5.8: Results of stationary te
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Table 5.10: Summary of Granger caus
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holiday sales. The results of the r
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Table 6.1: Storage capacity of the
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Intermarket grain flow is coordinat
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• a legal, regulatory, and enforc
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REFERENCES Al-Hassen, R., A. Dorwar
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Seppala, P. 1998. Decisive liberali
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achieve some welfare objective. The
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Annex Table 2.10: Have you faced di
Page 291 and 292: Annex Table 2.21: Do you consider p
Page 293 and 294: Annex Table 3.3: Cost structure of
Page 295 and 296: Annex Table 4.2: Complementary acti
Page 297 and 298: CHAPTER SEVEN Post-Harvest Grain Ma
Page 299 and 300: only (see Abebe 2000: 80-83). That
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Page 303 and 304: occur at all stages of post-harvest
Page 305 and 306: Endowment & access to Resources (e.
Page 307 and 308: Figure 2: The Study Areas (shaded a
Page 309 and 310: (6) β i = β 0 λ i , 0
Page 311 and 312: Intercrop differences Liquidity con
Page 313 and 314: eplace old animals (19 percent of h
Page 315 and 316: Table 5. Number and capacity of gra
Page 317 and 318: Table 7b.Estimated grain loss durin
Page 319 and 320: 7.1.3. Grain Marketing Practices an
Page 321 and 322: 1.8 Producers' price 1.6 1.4 1.2 1
Page 323 and 324: next season, grain prices tend to b
Page 325 and 326: Table 13: Regression results (Tobit
Page 327 and 328: of grain production was reportedly
Page 329 and 330: instruments to mitigate price risks
Page 331 and 332: Coulter, J. and G. Onumah, (2002).
Page 333 and 334: Appendix: Supplementary Tables Appe
Page 335 and 336: CHAPTER EIGHT Collective Action in
Page 337 and 338: The objectives of DRS were to popul
Page 339 and 340: increasing participation. Thus, the
Page 341: Table 2. Perceived change in benefi
Page 345 and 346: Table 14. Measures of wealth status
Page 347 and 348: Results from Regression Analysis Ta
Page 349 and 350: However, to maintain these benefits
Page 351 and 352: Table 18. Determinants of participa
Page 353 and 354: _______ 1981. Common property and c
Page 355 and 356: Management Regulations and Enforcem
Page 357 and 358: In theory, under PFM, the governmen
Page 359 and 360: 3.2 Desk study The desk study invol
Page 361 and 362: Table 1: Number and gender of indiv
Page 363 and 364: Poverty Increase in number of fishe
Page 365 and 366: Table 5: Responses given by various
Page 367 and 368: wages after the catch is sold (see
Page 369 and 370: 70 60 No of respondents 50 40 30 20
Page 371 and 372: 4.2.3 Lack of attention to social i
Page 373 and 374: 5.3 Regulate the construction of re
Page 375 and 376: REFERENCES Allison, E. H., and P. M
Page 377 and 378: APPENDIXES Appendix A: Districts of
Page 379 and 380: Questions and responses Government
Page 381 and 382: Questions and responses Lack of coo
Page 383 and 384: CHAPTER TEN Animal Health Service D
Page 385 and 386: • Individuals are selected for tr
Page 388 and 389: Makueni district was selected becau
Page 390 and 391: 1.5 Justification of the study The
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more sustainable (Leonard 1993; Uma
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of defined roles for CBAHWs within
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Interviews with veterinary officers
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The estimated model was of the form
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Gender remains a sensitive issue. P
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The most common ailments and diseas
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4.3 Factors influencing the level o
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Table 9 -- Factors influencing the
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Table 10 - Factors determining the
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Table 12 -- Current mean numbers of
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Figure 4: Percentage of household h
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CBAHWs were the most utilized chann
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Users of veterinarians’ services
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Table 18 -- Levels of incomes and l
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higher average calving per cow, whi
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Table 21 -- CBAHWs’ ranking of sp
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epresentative of livestock keepers
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Despite the restriction imposed by
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veterinarians. Such associations co
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References Akabwai, D., V. Shean, a
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Johnson, P. J., and C. Chahuares. 1
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Appendix 1: The Logistic Procedure
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Social Capital and Sustainable Agri
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1.1 Soil conservation programs and
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1.3 Research Objectives and Hypothe
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Institutional and Policy factors -
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land pressure is high (Holden 1991)
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include density of membership in gr
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then summed up according to increas
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Social capital, resource use, and a
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Table 4.4 Farmers’ perception of
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Table 4.5: Empowerment and politica
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Table 4.8: Indicators of collective
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Table 4.10: Comparison of means of
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5. The influence of social capital
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especially when considered on an ad
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households may pay less attention t
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Table 5.3 Determinants of terracing
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and Gichuki 1994). In the 1940s, th
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Table 5.4. Determinants of soil con
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5.3. Social capital, resource use,
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6. Implications for policy and prog
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essential for the formation of exte
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BIBLIOGRPAHY Admassie, Y., L. I. Mw
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Gambetta, D. 1988. Can we trust tru
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Social capital and watershed develo
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Obare, G. A., S. W. Omamo, and J. C
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Washington D.C.: The World Bank Tem
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Appendix: A list of Contributors Ab
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Appendix: Projects Supported Under
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IFPRI Eastern Africa Food Policy Ne
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