Historical Dictionary of Terrorism Third Edition

CHECHNYAN TERRORISM • 101On 1 October 1999 Russia began what has been described as its“second Chechnyan” war, ostensibly to destroy terrorist trainingcamps and to root terrorism out of the Caucasus region. Some observersbelieve that the government of Boris Yeltsin was deliberatelyplaying up Russian national feelings and resentments over the disastrous1994–1996 war to create a mood of national unity and supportfor his government that would help his electoral coalition in the 19December 1999 parliamentary elections. In fact, both the allegedChechen bombings within Russia occurring that autumn and thesecond offensive late in 1999 were to help Boris Yeltsin’s successor,Vladimir Vladimirovitch Putin, to bolster his image as a hard-linedefender of Russian nationalist values prior to the presidential electionsin Russia. In late December 1999 Russian troops had succeededin occupying much of Chechnya and captured Grozny on 6 February2000 following a two-month siege. In the Russian presidentialelection of 26 March 2000, Putin won a majority of 53 percent, anelectoral mandate achieved in part by public perceptions of his effectivenessin suppressing the Chechen revolt.The main external support for the Chechen extremists appears tocome from the estimated 15,000-strong “Afghans,” those Islamicveteran volunteers who came from outside Afghanistan to help theMujahideen fight the Soviet occupation in that country and whohave since then dispersed throughout the Muslim world, seekingto promote Islamist insurgencies elsewhere, including Chechnya.However, the Islamic Republic of Iran, which found itself atodds with the Sunni Wahhabi-dominated “Afghans” and with theWahhabi-dominated Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had its owngeopolitical reasons to support Russia in its attempts to contain thespread of Wahhabi-style fundamentalism in the Caucasus region.Azerbaijan, with its more secularized society and predominantlyShi’ite Muslim culture, has not shown itself inclined to supportthe Chechens in this conflict with Russia. Georgia, however, whichearlier had suffered from a Russian-backed secessionist movementamong the Abkhazians, in effect gave passive support to Chechenrebels by allowing them to use the Pankisi Gorge area as a stagingarea for attacks within Russian territory and by allowing them toset up offices in Tbilisi. Russia later accused Georgia of supplyingthe Chechens with some of its 146 or so Igla shoulder-held antiaircraftmissiles.