Historical Dictionary of Terrorism Third Edition

112 • COLOMBIAN COCAINE CARTELSconsidered agencies of a purported narco-terrorism threat; second,there is a growing concern about the convergence of organized crimewith terrorism in the post–cold war era, and these groups are the clearestexamples of such a convergence; and finally, the Colombian drugcartels have carried out entrepreneurial terrorist actions to eliminateleftist groups that have interfered with their operations as well as toco-opt and intimidate the national government of Colombia, whichhas been under U.S. pressure to eradicate the cocaine and opium drugtrade within its borders. Researcher Robert Filippone studied in depththe structure and mode of operations of these cartels and presentedhis findings in the article “The Medellín Cartel: Why We Can’t Winthe Drug War” (Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 17, no. 4 [October–December 1994]: 323–44), some of which are summarized here.The Medellín and Cali groups are not true cartels in the stricteconomic sense but rather two extended mob families that togetherhave supplied as much as 80 percent of the world’s cocaine and soldabout $20 billion worth per year to markets in the United States andelsewhere, bringing about $2–$4 billion back to Columbia each year.The Medellín group alone accounted for about 60 percent of thistrade in 1987 and had about 120,000 full-time employees, of whom2,000–3,000 were stationed in the United States. Carlos LehderRivas, a member of one of Colombia’s cocaine-exporting families,promoted the creation of an expanded cocaine market in the UnitedStates, earning over $1 million in profits from one air shipment.After eliminating Cuban rivals in Miami during 1978–1979, thecocaine-producing families of Colombia agreed to share this marketin a cartel-like arrangement, rather than fighting among themselves.The actual organization joining these families was finalized due tothe hostage-taking activities of the M-19 leftist guerrillas, a commonenemy against whom they could unite. In December 1981 theheads of these three leading cocaine-producing families contributed$7.5 million each to establish their own security force and antileftistdeath squad, known as Muerte a Secuestradores (MAS) (Death toKidnappers). Thus, the Medellín cartel became in effect a powerfulentrepreneurial terrorist group able to strike at targets both withinColombia and throughout the world.Under the triumvirate of Carlos Lehder, Jorge Ochoa, and PabloEscobar, the Medellín cartel consisted of 17 other “families” thateach carried out tasks of importing coca leaf, processing and refining