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Historical Dictionary of Terrorism Third Edition

Historical Dictionary of Terrorism Third Edition

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274 • INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004public and private websites. The Beirut airport bombing <strong>of</strong> 23October 1983 was a textbook example <strong>of</strong> Hezbollah using humanintelligence in the form <strong>of</strong> supposed ice cream vendors, who casedthe airport terminal and noted the routines <strong>of</strong> the U.S. Marines Corpsguards, and also technical and open source intelligence in the form <strong>of</strong>engineering plans for the construction <strong>of</strong> the airport terminal.Following the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks <strong>of</strong>September 11, 2001, the United States and other nations targeted byterrorism have debated the relative merits <strong>of</strong> having a more centralizedintelligence system instead <strong>of</strong> the pre–September 11 decentralizednational intelligence system with several agencies duplicating datagathering and analysis. While the virtues <strong>of</strong> centralization may seemintuitive, such a system runs the risk <strong>of</strong> institutional groupthink thatwould distort both the process <strong>of</strong> data collection and that <strong>of</strong> analysis.A system <strong>of</strong> multiple and <strong>of</strong>ten competing intelligence agencies maysuffer from the unwillingness <strong>of</strong> institutional rivals to share their information,but the redundancy <strong>of</strong> this system makes it less likely that allagencies will be blinded by the same groupthink. Following the Israeliintelligence failure that allowed the surprise attacks on Israel during theOctober 1973 war, the Agranat Commission convened to investigatethe cause(s) <strong>of</strong> that failure. The Commission noted that threat assessment<strong>of</strong> possible attacks was centralized in the one agency responsiblefor military intelligence, where a pervasive groupthink ruled out thepossibility that the Arabs would dare attack Israel and discountedcontrary evidence. In addition to debates over the relative merits <strong>of</strong>decentralized versus centralized national intelligence systems, there isan unresolved debate over what constitutes “actionable intelligence.”Some <strong>of</strong> the same voices that faulted U.S. national intelligence agenciesfor failing to predict and therefore to help prevent the September11 attacks also criticized the administration <strong>of</strong> George W. Bush fordeciding to launch the 2003 invasion <strong>of</strong> Iraq on the basis <strong>of</strong> scantintelligence. See also INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERROR-ISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004; FOREIGN INTELLIGENCESURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA); GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATIONSYSTEMS; USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001.INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTIONACT OF 2004. Public Law 108-458, under Title 50 <strong>of</strong> the U.S.Code, was passed by Congress on 6 December 2004 and signed into

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