Historical Dictionary of Terrorism Third Edition

660 • TALIBANThese attacks involved numerous suicide bombings, use of improvisedexplosive devices (IEDs) or rocket attacks, and much-improvedtactical cunning apparently due to emergent intelligence based on theexperiences of Islamist and other insurgents fighting U.S.-led forcesin Iraq. In 2005 at least 1,300 civilians and combatants were killed,while in 2006 monthly attacks by Taliban forces increased fourfold,leading to between 3,700 and 4,000 deaths, of which about 1,000were Taliban and al Qa’eda forces and 100 were ISAF troops, whilethe remainder were civilian casualties.Estimates of Taliban forces by late 2006 ran as high as 40,000,but approximately 25–50 percent of the renewed Taliban forcesappeared to consist of Pakistani recruits supplementing the largelyPushtun ethnic base of the group, causing some analysts to speakof a “neo-Taliban.” Another disturbing development is that manyprevious non-Taliban Afghan citizens and tribal leaders, who previouslyhad been hostile to the Taliban or else were holding back tosee which groups would emerge as winners in the current Afghanconflict, have begun to side with the Taliban for opportunistic reasons.One key motivation for their siding with the Taliban has beenthe latter’s willingness to permit local warlords, farmers, and drugdealers to produce and market opium, in defiance of Afghan governmentpolicy, on which the Taliban levy a 20 percent tax to financebuying of weapons, paying of new recruits, and paying of bounties tothe families of suicide bombers. Despite a failed offensive from Julyto October 2006 to regain control of their former de facto capital ofQandahar, by November 2007 the Taliban had effectively regained apermanent presence in 54 percent of the territory of Afghanistan.Political developments both within and outside Afghanistan appearto have been turning in favor of the Taliban. Within Pakistan,the government of President Pervez Musharraf, itself under siege byboth democratic and Islamist opponents, had largely backed awayfrom offensive operations against Taliban and al Qa’eda forces in thenorthwestern Federally Administered Tribal Areas after negotiatinga truce in February 2007 with Baitullah Mehsud, leader of the Pakistanibranch of the Taliban movement. By September 2007 AfghanPresident Hamid Karzai had raised the possibility of negotiationswith the Taliban, in part due to pressure from the Afghan Senate todo so. This move comes apparently in response to changing publicopinion among Afghanis, who have become more resigned to the