Historical Dictionary of Terrorism Third Edition

398 • LONDON BOMBINGS OF 7 JULY 2005Khan and Tanweer had known each other from childhood and,together with Hussein, were active in the Islamic youth clubs, gyms,and bookshops in the Leeds area. All were noted by acquaintancesas being religious but not overtly extremist. Khan and Tanweervisited Pakistan together from 19 November 2004 until 8 February2005. While there is no evidence that they attended terrorist trainingcamps in Afghanistan, later forensic examination of their bombmakingfactory in Leeds revealed sophisticated knowledge of bombassembly and also of countersurveillance measures in acquiring andassembling the materials: for instance, they transported materialsusing rental cars rather than their own vehicles, and often did notbuy materials directly but rather bought expensive consumer items,such as perfumes, which they would swap for needed bomb-makingmaterials through Internet barter sites. Evidence suggested thatthese individuals financed the operation themselves using their goodcredit histories to take out personal loans and to write checks withinsufficient funds to finance the trips abroad, the rented apartmentat 18 Alexandra Grove, and the bomb-making materials for approximately£8,000.Credit for the bombings was first claimed on the same day as thebombing by an unknown group, “Secret Organization: Al Qa’eda inEurope” over a pro–al Qa’eda website at 12:10 p.m., followed by anotherInternet posting on 9 July claiming responsibility in the nameof the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigade. The Arabic-language Al Jazeeratelevision news channel aired a tape on 1 September 2005 in whichKhan gave his martyrdom testimonial, explaining his reason for undertakingthe suicide bombing. On 6 July 2006 Al Jazeera aired thetestimonial video of Shehzad Tanweer, after which Ayman Zawahiri,the second-in-command of al Qa’eda, claimed that al Qa’eda hadtrained Khan and Tanweer to undertake the operation.The London bombings did not alter British public opinion orBritain’s cooperation with the United States in the same way thatthe Madrid bombings affected Spanish public opinion and policy.The revelation that British-born Muslims could be recruited into terrorismagainst their native homeland did come as a shock to Britishobservers, who had hoped that assimilation and policies protectingmulticulturalism and toleration of minorities would insulate Britain’sMuslim diaspora from being recruited into support for Islamic fundamentalistextremism.