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Historical Dictionary of Terrorism Third Edition

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564 • QA’EDA, ALsyndicates to raise funds and, in some instances, to attempt to buynuclear materials. However, such contacts with Shi’ites and variousnon-Muslim groups are short-term tactical accommodations ratherthan part <strong>of</strong> their long-term strategy.The relationship <strong>of</strong> al Qa’eda to current or former state sponsors<strong>of</strong> terrorism, such as Iran, Iraq, and Libya, has been low-level andsporadic, more in the nature <strong>of</strong> tactical accommodation than effectivecontrol by any state sponsor. Although Pakistan’s Inter-ServicesIntelligence formerly had al Qa’eda contacts and helped create theTaliban, after the September 11 attacks the Pakistani governmentaligned itself with the U.S. campaign against the Taliban and alQa’eda. In the past, the ruling elites <strong>of</strong> Saudi Arabia tolerated fundraisingfor al Qa’eda and limited activities within their borders onthe implicit understanding that in return al Qa’eda would not directlyattack them but with post-2001 al Qa’eda attacks on Saudi targets,including planned attacks within the holy city <strong>of</strong> Mecca, the question<strong>of</strong> passive Saudi support for al Qa’eda also became moot. Ironically,Libya was the first nation to issue an arrest warrant for bin Laden in1998 following the 1994 murder by al Qa’eda <strong>of</strong> a German couplevacationing in Surt, Libya. The Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafihas always repressed Salafist groups in Libya and even aided theAlgerian government in its war upon its Salafists in the 1990s byinterdicting Salafists operating along Libya’s western border withAlgeria and through intelligence cooperation.Following the September 11 attacks, questions were raised aboutIraqi support for al Qa’eda and in particular about possible Iraqisponsorship <strong>of</strong> those attacks. On 16 September 2003 U.S. Secretary<strong>of</strong> Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated there was no evidence <strong>of</strong> Iraqiinvolvement in the September 11 attacks but that there was evidence<strong>of</strong> earlier Iraqi aid to al Qa’eda in bomb construction and trainingin the use <strong>of</strong> chemical and biological weapons. With the overthrow<strong>of</strong> Saddam Hussein by U.S. troops in April 2003, the issue <strong>of</strong> Iraqistate sponsorship <strong>of</strong> terrorism in general was ended. However, therehas been some evidence <strong>of</strong> intermittent Iranian aid to al Qa’eda:Hezbollah trainers and Iranian Ministry <strong>of</strong> Intelligence and Securityagents trained al Qa’eda fighters in their camps in Sudan, in Hezbollahcamps in Lebanon, and in training bases within Iran. ImadMaghniyah, the Hezbollah mastermind <strong>of</strong> the 23 October 1983 Beirutbombing <strong>of</strong> the U.S. Marines encampment, was known to have

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