The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

124 NATIONAL DEFENCE AND EUROPEAN COOPERATIONUS$ b.50045040035030025020015010050USAEU1501988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003Figure 6.1. Total military expenditure of EU member states and military expenditureof the USA, 1989–2003Figures are in constant (2003) US dollars. The EU15 are the 15 post-1995 members of theEuropean Union.Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Databaseproblem is covered elsewhere in this volume, but its essence is that governmentsappear reluctant to withdraw support for an industry that cannot competewithout the government’s business and that this leads at the European level tothe over-production of equipment—sometimes of inappropriate equipment fortoday’s defence needs, for example, the Eurofighter—for national and Europeanmarkets. In some cases it has led to irresponsible exporting of weaponsand equipment to unstable regions and repressive regimes. 19This combination of structural problems has driven EU member states, theEuropean Commission, the EU Presidency and the defence industry—aftermany years of hesitation—to push collectively for a breakthrough on armamentspolicy at the EU level. The argument is that, if defence spending is not toincrease, one obvious way of bridging capability gaps is through increasedcooperation in armaments. Joint procurement of the necessary equipment wouldoffer savings through economies of scale and reduced duplication. However,this might not be such an easy option, given that the armaments market in theEU is not particularly efficient, European defence industrial consolidation isstill patchy and defence procurement remains oriented towards national needs.Two dominant features are evident on the defence industrial scene: a growingmonopolization in the aerospace and defence electronics sectors; and a lack of19 Miller, D., Export or Die: Britain’s Defence Trade with Iran and Iraq (Cassell: London, 1996).