The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

346 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, THEIR REGION AND EUROPEcome to each other’s aid with all necessary means in the event of terroriststrikes on their territory. 77 The continually enhanced scope and depth of ESDPas such, and the conceptual tightening up and deepening of other areas of EUsecurity policy such as the new Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons ofMass Destruction, 78 offer means that are not inferior but rather different in kindto those of NATO for protecting and promoting Europe’s security interests andits goals and values in the wider world. In short, the EU already offers aremarkably full menu of ‘soft’ security protection to its members in their ownhomelands; it has ‘hard’ (military) as well as unusually strong ‘soft’ instrumentsat its disposal for promoting its members’ interests abroad; and—manywould say—it is moving down a slippery slope towards providing full formalterritorial guarantees, even if it still falls well short of a credible ‘alliance’ atpresent. Even without a positive wish to enhance its defence role, the EU mightfind itself drawn into taking greater responsibility for the all-round security ofits members as a consequence of NATO’s gradual retreat from a territorialdefence function, combined with the sheer expanse of the EU’s new territory(following the ‘big bang’ enlargement of May 2004) and the challenging securitydimensions of its relationships with ‘new neighbours’ on every front. 79Of all the states in Europe, Iceland perhaps has the strongest internal barriersto recognition of these factors and the fundamental policy change needed toadapt to them. As noted above, pro-USA and anti-EU sentiments are deeplyingrained in the political mainstream, linked with concepts of nationalindependence and with the defence of Iceland’s fisheries (which is seen as animportant component of security in itself). Membership of the Schengen systemand the EEA already gives Iceland ‘soft security’ cover from those areas of EUcompetence that are of direct relevance to the country, whereas (for reasonsexplained above) it is not much of a customer for the other security-relatedservices that the EU can offer. Also relevant is the Icelandic tendency, so far, tothink of national security and deterrence in extremely concrete, military terms:thus, when threatened with withdrawal of the US F-15s in 2003, some Icelandicofficials speculated about whether similar aircraft might be provided by friendlyEuropean states such as Germany or the UK. This is not a currency in which theEU, as such, is ever likely to be able to satisfy Iceland’s wants.Nevertheless, a growing number of leading Icelandic politicians, particularlyin the ranks of the Social Democratic Alliance, argue that by joining the EU andadopting its security and defence policy Iceland could go some way to solvingthe problem of diminishing US military interest in the country. This seems alsoto be the view of the conservative Minister for Justice, Björn Bjarnason, who isthe main specialist on defence and security within the Independence Party. He77 Council of the European Union, ‘Declaration on combating terrorism’, Brussels, 25 Mar. 2004, URL.78 Council of the European Union, ‘EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of MassDestruction’, Brussels, 12 Dec. 2003, URL .79 Bailes, A. J. K., ‘How collective is our defence?’, Sicherheit und Frieden—Security and Peace,vol. 23, no. 2 (2005), pp. 90–95.