The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

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376 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, THEIR REGION AND EUROPEFourth, Russian defence policy guidelines are studied closely by the Balticmilitary leaderships. 56 It has been noted in the Baltic capitals that Russia’sdefence priorities have changed in favour of nuclear forces at the expense ofconventional forces. From this it is understood that those arguing for a deterrencestrategy have the upper hand in Moscow over those in favour of forcestrained and equipped to handle Russia’s regional conflicts. This could, ironically,be good news for the Baltic states if it did not reflect a persistent cold warattitude. Another important change alerting the Baltic states is Russia’s declareddoctrine of resorting to nuclear weapons both to defend its national territoriesand to prevent significant military defeat. Specific reference is made in thiscontext to defence of Russian citizens in zones of ‘political and other forms ofinstability’. 57 The deterrence strategy is openly aimed at Russia’s strategic partners,NATO and the EU. Since the nuclear capabilities of the Leningrad militarydistrict are only a few hundred kilometres from the Estonian border, this isconsidered sufficient reason for the Baltic states to be on guard. These weapons,when aimed at NATO, are now also pointed at the Baltic capitals.Finally, there is constant concern in the Baltic capitals about Russia’sattempts to gain influence within NATO. These attempts are interpreted as aRussian hope to transform NATO from a defence alliance to merely a securityalliance: a hope that might be further encouraged by some EU states’ wish toedge the USA out of Europe. Since the influence of big states such as Franceand Germany on potential EU responses to Russia is strong, the EU’s responsewhen its help is really needed might be unpredictable at best, and negative atworst, for the three Baltic states.The above arguments, which reflect the worst-case scenarios for Estonia,Latvia and Lithuania, should not be seen as constituting the Baltic governments’day-to-day agenda as of 2005. Russia is not considered an immediatethreat to their hard security. The concern is, rather, for the potential failure ofRussia’s military, political and economic reform and for the prevalence of stillstronger nationalistic trends. The pockets of efficiently functioning militarycapability might then be used with or without the consent of Moscow. What isfrustrating for Baltic military analysts and security managers is their WestEuropean partners’ lack of will to take the Baltic security concerns seriously,combined with European anger when the Baltic states turn to the USA on these56 E.g., Russian Federation, ‘National Security Concept of the Russian Federation’, Moscow, 10 Jan.2000, English translation in Arbatov, A. G. and Chernikov, E. L. (eds), Russian Federation Legal Acts onCivil–Military Relations (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Geneva, 2003),URL ; Russian Federation,‘Military doctrine of the Russian Federation’, Moscow, 21 Apr. 2000, English translation in Arbatov andChernikov (eds); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ‘Foreign Policy Concept of theRussian Federation’, Moscow, 10 July 2000, URL ; and Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation, The Priority Tasks of the Developmentof the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation:Moscow, 2003), URL .57 Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation (note 56), p. 63. See also Ivanov, S., Minister of Defenceof the Russian Federation, ‘Russia’s geopolitical priorities and armed forces’, Russia in Global Affairs,vol. 2, no. 1 (Jan./Feb. 2004), URL .
BALTIC PERSPECTIVES 377issues. The lesson they draw is that Russia is a strategic partner in the eyes ofthe other European states and is not to be mentioned as a threat. ‘The best thingis to shut up and do our work’, was one Baltic conclusion on how to ‘muddlethrough’ in the EU context. 58 ‘However, if the EU gets a strategy it could behelpful in discussions with Russia because it is large and has more tools to bargain.All our experience on discussions with Russia demonstrates that Russiaprefers to deal with bigger partners.’ 59Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have adopted the position of not singling outany state as a potential enemy in their national security concepts. Lithuania, inparticular, also stresses the need to cooperate with Russia. All three countriestake active approaches towards the countries of the Commonwealth ofIndependent States (CIS), in particular in the Caucasus region. While they aimat a cooperative approach with Russia, it is seen as a country capable of swiftand dramatic changes and with an ability to manipulate developments in Belarusand Ukraine. Therefore, unless Russian political, economic, administrativeand military reforms become deeply anchored and the country becomes morepredictable, transparent and democratic, the Baltic states will continue to see aneed to balance Russia with another strong power. The EU is not assumed tohave the will or the ability to play this role; it simply does not have the muscle.Furthermore, Russia tends to ignore the EU if the Europeans are not supportedby the USA. 60 Therefore, on hard security issues the Baltic states turn to theUSA.V. Providers of national security in the BalticThe national security concepts of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania each list anumber of actors with an impact on their countries’ security: the USA; NATOand the EU; and regional partners such as the other Baltic states, the othercountries around the Baltic Sea and the Nordic countries. The decisive role inthe Baltic states’ national security, understood as the defence of their territorialintegrity and sovereignty, lies with NATO backed by the USA. Generallyspeaking, NATO is in charge of military security, the EU of economic security.For Estonia, the ‘cornerstone of European security is the U.S. military presenceand consistent participation in the ensuring of this security’. 61 Militarysecurity is entrusted to NATO as the ‘only effective international defence andsecurity organisation’. NATO provides the ‘common defence of its Membersand the ensuring of international stability’. 62 Although people both inside andoutside NATO are increasingly challenging the existence of any automatic58 Interviews (note 1).59 Interviews (note 1).60 Chechnya is mentioned as one of the many examples where Russia is hoodwinking Western negotiators.See, e.g., Bendersky, Y., ‘The Chechnya factor in Russia–EU relations’, ISN Security Watch, 5 Oct.2004, URL .61 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (note 9), section 2.4.1.62 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (note 9), section 2.1.
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THE NORDICCOUNTRIES ANDTHE EUROPEAN
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Alyson J. K. Bailes (United Kingdom
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The Nordic Countries andthe Europea
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The Nordic Countries andthe Europea
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ContentsPrefacexiiAbbreviations and
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CONTENTSII. The European security c
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CONTENTSII. The small arms and ligh
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CONTENTSII. Iceland and the emergen
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PREFACEThe conference on the Nordic
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2 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND THE ESDP
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10 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND THE ESD
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Editor’s remarksGunilla HerolfPar
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EDITOR’S REMARKS 31which the vari
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EDITOR’S REMARKS 33mark as well s
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EDITOR’S REMARKS 35The Europeaniz
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1. Denmark and the European Securit
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 39European def
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 41safely leave
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 43motions to t
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 45effective
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 47connected an
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52 INSTITUTIONAL AND NATIONAL POLIT
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100 INSTITUTIONAL AND NATIONAL POLI
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Part IINational defence and Europea
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114 THE BROADER DIMENSIONS OF SECUR
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6. The impact of EU capability targ
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CAPABILITY TARGETS AND OPERATIONAL
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7. The impact of EU capability targ
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THE CASE OF SWEDEN 143Government ha
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THE CASE OF SWEDEN 145immediate reg
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THE CASE OF SWEDEN 147SAF Headquart
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THE CASE OF SWEDEN 149the navy will
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‘NOT ONLY, BUT ALSO NORDIC’ 151
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9. Hardware politics, ‘hard polit
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HARDWARE POLITICS 169Sweden’s sec
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HARDWARE POLITICS 171the exploitati
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HARDWARE POLITICS 173share of Finla
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HARDWARE POLITICS 175and procuremen
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HARDWARE POLITICS 177of internation
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HARDWARE POLITICS 179reluctant to a
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HARDWARE POLITICS 181EU ambitions a
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HARDWARE POLITICS 183Nordic armamen
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10. The Nordic attitude to and role
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DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL COLLABORATION 18
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Part IIINordic handling of the broa
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13. The Nordic countries and conven
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14. Nordic nuclear non-proliferatio
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16. Muddling through: how the EU is
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Editor’s remarksAlyson J. K. Bail
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302 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, THEIR REG
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Page 344 and 345: 326 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, THEIR REG
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Page 411 and 412: AppendixExtracts from the Treaty Es
Page 413 and 414: ments, to promote measures to satis
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Page 421 and 422: EU CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY 403enhance
Page 423 and 424: ABOUT THE AUTHORS 405ning, Det 21.
Page 425 and 426: ABOUT THE AUTHORS 407Karlis Neretni
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Page 429 and 430: INDEX 411Atlanticism 364banking 357
Page 431 and 432: INDEX 413Kosovo and 45Left Socialis
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Page 437 and 438: INDEX 419Iceland Defense Force 328,
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INDEX 427Vienna Documents 236Viking
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