The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

BALTIC PERSPECTIVES 371to weaken the Baltic states’ membership of the EU by imposing ‘special provisions’for economic relations between Russia and the Baltic states, thus turningthe latter into ‘second rank’ EU members that cannot fully comply with EUrules. An example substantiating the Baltic concern might be the conclusionsdrawn at the EU–Russia Industrialists’ Round Table in 2003. The impact of EUenlargement on bilateral EU–Russia relations was extensively discussed duringthe sessions: the Russian participants argued that application of the EU internalmarket rules might hurt Russian industry’s traditional trade interests in Centraland East European states and, further, that subordination of the national legislationof acceding states to EU laws would invalidate a large number of bilateraltrade and economic agreements with these states. The response from the Europeanparticipants—none of whom was from the Baltic states, although Hungaryand Poland were represented—was not calculated to lessen Baltic concern. Itwas concluded that special provisions have been negotiated and are still beingnegotiated in areas of Russian interest in order to avoid or reduce the problems.31 Yet such ‘special provisions’ are exactly what the Baltic states fear. Inparticular, they are aiming for membership of the Schengen Agreement on thefree movement of people and consider any ‘special provisions’ as endangeringthis target.One of the burning issues between the Baltic states and Russia, and alsobetween the Baltic states and the West European democracies, is the rights ofthe Russian-speaking minorities. 32 The national security guidelines of Estonia,Latvia and Lithuania take different approaches to the issue of Russian-speakingminorities. In Latvia’s 2002 National Security Concept considerable attention isgiven the goal of integrating society, defined as ‘one of the most significantfactors which stabilises [the] internal political situation in the country’. 33 TheEstonian National Security Concept is preoccupied with external threats, whilethe Russian-speaking minority is considered to be an internal problem thatwould only become a security issue if it were exploited by a foreign power, forexample, by placing Estonia in a negative light vis-à-vis its EU partners.Progress on the minority issue is reflected in recent reports from the Organizationfor Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In Estonia and Latviatreatment of the Russian-speaking minorities has been of considerable concernto both the OSCE and the EU. The OSCE Mission in Estonia focused its attentionon broad-reaching issues such as the language law, election law and thelabour force. Furthermore, Russia’s energy supplies to the EU can help to enhance Europe’s energy security.’European Commission, ‘The EU’s relations with Russia: overview, economics and trade’, Materialfrom the EU–Russia Summit, The Hague, 25 Nov. 2004, URL .31 EU–Russia Industrialists’ Round Table (note 25), section 2, ‘The EU enlargement and bilateralcooperation’.32 Russians accounted for 25.6% of the population of Estonia in 2001, 32.5% of the population ofLatvia in 1997, and 6.3% of the population of Lithuania in 2001. Turner, B. (ed.), The Statesman’s Yearbook2005 (Palgrave MacMillan: Basingstoke, 2004), pp. 600, 1037, 1066.33 Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (note 9), section 2.2.4.