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The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

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22 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND THE ESDPpan-<strong>European</strong> cooperation in preventive measures <strong>and</strong> contingency planning foremergencies? What stumbling blocks might be thrown up by <strong>the</strong> reluctance feltin some <strong>Nordic</strong> quarters, notably in Sweden, about using ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>ir own oranyone else’s military forces to deal with challenges to internal order <strong>and</strong> civilsecurity? 56<strong>The</strong> integrative virusNATO’s inter-governmental character, <strong>and</strong> its tolerance of wide variation inmembers’ defence practices <strong>and</strong> contributions, left plenty of room for <strong>Nordic</strong>singularities. When work on <strong>the</strong> ESDP began within <strong>the</strong> EU, it was also placedwell outside <strong>the</strong> traditional EU treaty structure <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> grasp of <strong>the</strong> <strong>European</strong>Commission. Decision making proceeded in intergovernmental committeeswithout majority voting; <strong>the</strong> initial Headline Goal for <strong>European</strong> capabilities wasdefined in 1999 in a non-legislative fashion that made national contributionsessentially optional; 57 <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>re was no immediate provision for collectivefinancing. 58 Even in <strong>the</strong> space of a few years, however, it has become clear thatthis domain of EU work cannot be shielded indefinitely—any more than anyo<strong>the</strong>r—from <strong>the</strong> harmonizing, collectivizing <strong>and</strong> integrative tendencies inherentin Union governance. To <strong>the</strong> extent that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Nordic</strong> countries have been fur<strong>the</strong>rremoved than o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>European</strong> states from genuinely collective defence practicesup to now, <strong>the</strong>y are likely to face particular strains as <strong>and</strong> when <strong>the</strong> ESDPincreases <strong>the</strong> pressure for: (a) harmonizing military doctrines so that collectiveoverseas operations become <strong>the</strong>ir prime rationale, ra<strong>the</strong>r than a secondaryoption for <strong>the</strong> use of essentially territorial forces; 59 (b) phasing out con-56 Again, Denmark is somewhat of an exception in having merged its defence headquarters with itscivil emergency authority <strong>and</strong> in imposing no clear dividing line between internal <strong>and</strong> external securitytasks. In o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Nordic</strong> countries <strong>the</strong>re is a clear trend to more open <strong>and</strong> innovative debate on <strong>the</strong> limits ofmilitary involvement, <strong>and</strong> non-ESDP-related events such as <strong>the</strong> tsunami of Dec. 2004 <strong>and</strong> destructivestorms of early 2005 in Skåne have been particularly influential in Sweden’s re-think. For more on <strong>the</strong>seissues see chapters 15 <strong>and</strong> 16 in this volume.57 As defined in <strong>the</strong> Helsinki decisions (note 1), <strong>the</strong> goal was to have 60 000 EU personnel available fordeployment within 60 days. It was left to each country to decide what it could <strong>and</strong> would offer towards <strong>the</strong>total, <strong>and</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r to help in providing certain key supporting equipment <strong>and</strong> facilities.58 It was only in 2002 that <strong>the</strong> EU reached agreement on collectively financing certain additional <strong>and</strong>joint costs of a given operation. <strong>The</strong> major costs of personnel, <strong>the</strong>ir pay <strong>and</strong> equipment will continue to ‘liewhere <strong>the</strong>y fall’ with <strong>the</strong> providing nations.59 <strong>The</strong> Swedish Government’s 2004 defence policy defines <strong>the</strong> aim of national defence as ‘to preserve<strong>the</strong> country’s peace <strong>and</strong> independence by: helping to manage <strong>and</strong> prevent crises in <strong>the</strong> world around us,asserting our territorial integrity, defending Sweden against armed attack, protecting <strong>the</strong> civilian population<strong>and</strong> safeguarding <strong>the</strong> most important societal functions in <strong>the</strong> event of war’. Government Offices ofSweden, ‘Our future defence: <strong>the</strong> focus of Swedish defence policy 2005–2007’, Swedish Ministry of<strong>Defence</strong>, Stockholm, Oct. 2004, URL , p. 10; see alsochapter 7 in this volume. Here an important shift has taken place towards a primarily outward-lookingmission, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> same policy statement duly prescribes a greater concentration of effort on forces deployableexternally. In Norway, however, <strong>the</strong> armed forces’ objectives are still defined in <strong>the</strong> following order:‘to prevent war <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> emergence of threats to our national <strong>and</strong> collective security’; ‘to contribute topeace, stability <strong>and</strong> to fur<strong>the</strong>r develop international rule of law’; ‘to uphold Norwegian sovereignty’; ‘toact in concert with our allies to defend Norway <strong>and</strong> NATO against assault’; <strong>and</strong> ‘to safeguard Norwegiansociety against any form of assault’. Norwegian Ministry of <strong>Defence</strong>, ‘Norwegian <strong>Defence</strong> 2005’, Feb.

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