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The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

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308 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, THEIR REGION AND EUROPEcooperation <strong>and</strong> free market structures. 26 While Denmark held on to its opt-outstrategy, this development in <strong>the</strong> EU led to <strong>the</strong> opposite strategy in Norway.After <strong>the</strong> Anglo-French St Malo summit of December 1998, <strong>the</strong> NorwegianGovernment really started to fear marginalization in <strong>European</strong> security, <strong>and</strong>several attempts were made to achieve some form of association with <strong>European</strong>security policy. This is why <strong>the</strong> Norwegian Government proposed a significantcontribution to <strong>the</strong> EU’s 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal—a policy that has beenreferred to as a ‘troops for influence’ strategy. 27As argued above, Finl<strong>and</strong>, Norway <strong>and</strong> Sweden have been slow to transform<strong>the</strong>ir national defence forces. While <strong>the</strong> changes in <strong>the</strong> Danish defence forceswere a (ra<strong>the</strong>r immediate) reaction to <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> cold war, this was not <strong>the</strong>case in <strong>the</strong> three o<strong>the</strong>r countries. <strong>The</strong>se countries focused on possible negativedevelopments to <strong>the</strong> east, <strong>and</strong> this was used to legitimize <strong>the</strong> continuedemphasis on significant territorial defence capacity. Not until <strong>the</strong> late 1990s,after <strong>the</strong> ESDP was launched, were concrete proposals for transforming <strong>the</strong>national defence forces presented in Finl<strong>and</strong>, Norway <strong>and</strong> Sweden. Although<strong>the</strong> ESDP process is not <strong>the</strong> only explanation, it seems to have at least accelerated<strong>the</strong> transformation processes in all three countries. In Norway <strong>and</strong> Sweden<strong>the</strong> important changes that have been introduced into <strong>the</strong> defence structures inrecent years have been followed by a change in <strong>the</strong> dominant domestic securitydiscourses. In Finl<strong>and</strong>, however, a more traditional security discourse has beenretained <strong>and</strong> any alterations were legitimized by reference to <strong>the</strong>ir importancefor bolstering <strong>the</strong> Finnish national defence capacity. As argued above, Denmarkundertook such a transformation of its defence forces at an earlier stage; yet <strong>the</strong>launch of <strong>the</strong> ESDP also had some impact here. In fact, <strong>the</strong> establishment of <strong>the</strong>ESDP led to a discussion about <strong>the</strong> value of <strong>the</strong> Danish defence opt-out, focusingespecially on <strong>the</strong> risk that Denmark could become marginalized within <strong>the</strong><strong>European</strong> security system.This shows that <strong>the</strong> development towards a <strong>European</strong> security <strong>and</strong> defencepolicy has influenced <strong>the</strong> national security discourse in all <strong>the</strong> <strong>Nordic</strong> countries,but that differences in each nation’s relationship with <strong>the</strong> EU <strong>and</strong> its securitypolicy traditions have generated differences between national responses. InNorway <strong>and</strong> Sweden <strong>the</strong> emergence of <strong>the</strong> ESDP accelerated <strong>the</strong> move towardsmodernization of <strong>the</strong> defence forces, also involving some changes in <strong>the</strong> conceptionof security. In Finl<strong>and</strong> it led to greater emphasis on <strong>the</strong> internationaldimension, but combined with a continued traditional view of security. In26 Danish <strong>Defence</strong> Commission of 1997, Fremtidens forsvar [<strong>Defence</strong> for <strong>the</strong> future] (Forsvarsministeriet:Copenhagen, 1998), URL .27 Græger, N., ‘Norway <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> EU’s defence dimension: a “troops for influence” strategy’, eds N.Græger, H. Larsen <strong>and</strong> H. Ojanen, <strong>The</strong> ESDP <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Nordic</strong> <strong>Countries</strong>: Four Variations on a <strong>The</strong>me(Ulkopoliittinen Instituutti: Helsinki, 2002), pp. 33–89. While most Norwegian politicians have acceptedthis strategy, Norway’s participation in <strong>the</strong> EU’s new Headline Goal 2010, which includes multinationalbattle groups operating on <strong>the</strong> dem<strong>and</strong> of <strong>the</strong> UN or <strong>the</strong> OSCE, is seen as more problematic. Some arguethat such participation contravenes Norway’s constitution, while o<strong>the</strong>rs argue that Norway’s non-participationin <strong>the</strong> EU’s decision-making bodies makes participation in such an integrated force difficult todefend; see chapter 19 in this volume.

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