The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

More documents

Recommendations

Info

292 THE BROADER DIMENSIONS OF SECURITYSecurity Council Resolution 1540 on WMD transfer and trafficking, 7 althoughthere might be other ‘dangerous materials’ that this would not cover.As mentioned above, policing, intelligence, defence and civil protectionremain areas of member state competence. Whereas in the wake of 11 September2001 the EU strengthened its legal and judicial cooperation and createdcommon analytical capabilities within Europol and Eurojust, 8 there has beenrelatively little focus on creating common civil protection capabilities. Acommon database covering member state capabilities exists, but equipment andstandards currently vary widely between member states, compromising interoperabilitybetween national services.In the wake of the terrorist attacks on Madrid on 11 March 2004, EU leaderspledged with the so-called ‘Solidarity Clause’ to come to each others’ aid incase of a terrorist attack or natural disaster, with all available civil and militarymeans. 9 If policy makers are serious about the Solidarity Clause, it would belogical to move towards common EU standards and procedures for civil protectionand emergency response in order to ensure interoperability betweennational services. In that way, solidarity would be more than just a politicalsignal: it would have practical value for ‘first responders’ on the ground and forcitizens in a disaster area. Naturally, strong national economic interests wouldcomplicate a move towards common standards, emphasizing again the need forpolitical courage in order to improve the security of EU citizens against newthreats.Standardization would in itself provide a tremendous boost to common EUcivil protection capabilities. However, specialized capabilities—for example, toprevent and protect against WMD incidents—might be in short supply. In additionto charting and ranking EU vulnerabilities, an EU vulnerability commissioncould also formulate headline goals for societal security, assuming that thecommission concludes that current capabilities are not sufficient to meet EUsocietal security needs.IV. ImplementationSocietal security spans a broad field. If the effort to maintain societal security isto be effective, numerous agencies, different levels of government, privatecompanies and the public need to be persuaded to play a part.Table 16.2 lists some of the major functions included in the emerging area ofsocietal security. Using Denmark as an example, the table illustrates the number7 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, 28 Apr. 2004, URL .8 Europol was established by the EU in 1995 with the objective of improving police cooperationbetween the member states in order to combat terrorism, illicit traffic in drugs and other serious forms ofinternational crime. Eurojust was established in 2002 by the EU with the aim of enhancing the effectivenessof member states’ authorities in dealing with the investigation and prosecution of serious cross-borderand organized crime.9 Council of the European Union, ‘Declaration on combating terrorism’, Brussels, 24 Mar. 2004, URL. See also the Introduction to this volume.
MUDDLING THROUGH 293of actors involved in providing security on the member state level. The righthandcolumn lists the additional actors involved at the EU level.The long list of stakeholders indicates the difficulty of ensuring effectivecross-governmental coordination. The Danish experience indicates that even atthe national level it can be extremely difficult to persuade governmentalagencies and companies that do not have security as their primary mission togive priority to vulnerability reduction and emergency planning. 10 If this is thecase even in a small country where homeland security is among the top prioritiesof the government, where most top bureaucrats know each other and wheremost ministries are located within walking distance of each other, coordinationand prioritization of homeland security in the EU will not be an easy task. Persuasionand voluntary coordination might not suffice when it comes to motivatingand coordinating a large number of less than enthusiastic actors.As shown in table 16.2, responsibility for protective and preventive initiativesin the EU is divided between the Council of the European Union and the EuropeanCommission, between several different directorates-general, betweenauthorities at the EU and national levels, and between different organizationsand levels of government within the EU member states. After the March 2004terrorist attacks on Madrid, EU leaders appointed an anti-terrorism coordinatorto coordinate the work of the Council and to ‘maintain an overview’ of all EUinstruments for the prevention of and protection against terrorism. 11 Yet, lackingline management authority over most of the actors listed in table 16.2, theEU anti-terrorism coordinator has to rely on the power of persuasion—aninadequate instrument judging from the Danish experience. Arguably, if Europeis to forge an effective societal security policy, a stronger anti-terrorismcoordinator with a staff and budget will be needed. Such a person, armed withdiscretionary funds that could be distributed in order to promote the upgradingand standardization of member state capabilities, could also be charged withfollowing up on the implementation of societal security headline goals, shouldthe EU decide that current capabilities are insufficient.The final elements of the effective and efficient implementation of a strategyfor societal security are instruments for regular evaluation. The ultimate measureof success in the large area of societal security, at least in terms of preventionand of improvement of resilience (as distinct from emergencyresponse), is the absence of events. This obviously complicates programmeevaluation. An EU vulnerability commission would thus also have to considerwhat proxy variables the EU could monitor to ensure the effectiveness and efficiencyof the effort. It also remains important to monitor programmes and initiativesfor unintended side effects. Raising security in one area—for example,around one category of potential terrorist targets—might compromise securityin other sectors or geographical locations. Security measures involving the10 Danish Emergency Management Agency, ‘Samlet evalueringsrapport: krisestyringsøvelse 2003(KRISØV 2003)’ [Joint evaluation report: crisis control exercise 2003 (KRISØV 2003)], Beredskabsstyrelsens:Copenhagen, Nov. 2004, URL , pp. 7, 12.11 Council of the European Union (note 9).
Page 1 and 2:
THE NORDICCOUNTRIES ANDTHE EUROPEAN
Page 3 and 4:
Alyson J. K. Bailes (United Kingdom
Page 5 and 6:
The Nordic Countries andthe Europea
Page 7 and 8:
The Nordic Countries andthe Europea
Page 9 and 10:
ContentsPrefacexiiAbbreviations and
Page 11 and 12:
CONTENTSII. The European security c
Page 13 and 14:
CONTENTSII. The small arms and ligh
Page 15 and 16:
CONTENTSII. Iceland and the emergen
Page 17:
PREFACEThe conference on the Nordic
Page 20 and 21:
2 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND THE ESDP
Page 22 and 23:
Page 24 and 25:
Page 26 and 27:
Page 28 and 29:
10 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND THE ESD
Page 30 and 31:
Page 32 and 33:
Page 34 and 35:
Page 36 and 37:
Page 38 and 39:
Page 40 and 41:
Page 42 and 43:
Page 44 and 45:
Page 47 and 48:
Editor’s remarksGunilla HerolfPar
Page 49 and 50:
EDITOR’S REMARKS 31which the vari
Page 51 and 52:
EDITOR’S REMARKS 33mark as well s
Page 53 and 54:
EDITOR’S REMARKS 35The Europeaniz
Page 55 and 56:
1. Denmark and the European Securit
Page 57 and 58:
DENMARK AND THE ESDP 39European def
Page 59 and 60:
DENMARK AND THE ESDP 41safely leave
Page 61 and 62:
DENMARK AND THE ESDP 43motions to t
Page 63 and 64:
DENMARK AND THE ESDP 45effective
Page 65 and 66:
DENMARK AND THE ESDP 47connected an
Page 70 and 71:
52 INSTITUTIONAL AND NATIONAL POLIT
Page 72 and 73:
Page 74 and 75:
Page 76 and 77:
Page 78 and 79:
Page 80 and 81:
Page 82 and 83:
Page 84 and 85:
Page 86 and 87:
Page 88 and 89:
Page 90 and 91:
Page 92 and 93:
Page 94 and 95:
Page 96 and 97:
Page 98 and 99:
Page 100 and 101:
Page 102 and 103:
Page 104 and 105:
Page 106 and 107:
Page 108 and 109:
Page 110 and 111:
Page 112 and 113:
Page 114 and 115:
Page 116 and 117:
Page 118 and 119:
100 INSTITUTIONAL AND NATIONAL POLI
Page 120 and 121:
Page 122 and 123:
Page 124 and 125:
Page 126 and 127:
Page 129:
Part IINational defence and Europea
Page 132 and 133:
114 THE BROADER DIMENSIONS OF SECUR
Page 134 and 135:
Page 137 and 138:
6. The impact of EU capability targ
Page 139 and 140:
CAPABILITY TARGETS AND OPERATIONAL
Page 141 and 142:
Page 143 and 144:
Page 145 and 146:
Page 147 and 148:
Page 149 and 150:
Page 151 and 152:
Page 153 and 154:
Page 155 and 156:
Page 157 and 158:
Page 159 and 160:
7. The impact of EU capability targ
Page 161 and 162:
THE CASE OF SWEDEN 143Government ha
Page 163 and 164:
THE CASE OF SWEDEN 145immediate reg
Page 165 and 166:
THE CASE OF SWEDEN 147SAF Headquart
Page 167 and 168:
THE CASE OF SWEDEN 149the navy will
Page 169 and 170:
‘NOT ONLY, BUT ALSO NORDIC’ 151
Page 171 and 172:
Page 173 and 174:
Page 175 and 176:
Page 177 and 178:
Page 179 and 180:
Page 181 and 182:
Page 183 and 184:
Page 185 and 186:
9. Hardware politics, ‘hard polit
Page 187 and 188:
HARDWARE POLITICS 169Sweden’s sec
Page 189 and 190:
HARDWARE POLITICS 171the exploitati
Page 191 and 192:
HARDWARE POLITICS 173share of Finla
Page 193 and 194:
HARDWARE POLITICS 175and procuremen
Page 195 and 196:
HARDWARE POLITICS 177of internation
Page 197 and 198:
HARDWARE POLITICS 179reluctant to a
Page 199 and 200:
HARDWARE POLITICS 181EU ambitions a
Page 201 and 202:
HARDWARE POLITICS 183Nordic armamen
Page 203 and 204:
10. The Nordic attitude to and role
Page 205 and 206:
DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL COLLABORATION 18
Page 207 and 208:
Page 209 and 210:
Page 211:
Part IIINordic handling of the broa
Page 214 and 215:
Page 216 and 217:
Page 218 and 219:
Page 220 and 221:
Page 222 and 223:
Page 224 and 225:
Page 226 and 227:
Page 228 and 229:
Page 230 and 231:
Page 232 and 233:
Page 234 and 235:
Page 236 and 237:
Page 238 and 239:
Page 240 and 241:
Page 242 and 243:
Page 244 and 245:
Page 246 and 247:
Page 248 and 249:
Page 250 and 251:
Page 252 and 253:
13. The Nordic countries and conven
Page 254 and 255:
Page 256 and 257:
Page 258 and 259:
Page 260 and 261: 242 THE BROADER DIMENSIONS OF SECUR
Page 270 and 271: 14. Nordic nuclear non-proliferatio
Page 306 and 307: 16. Muddling through: how the EU is
Page 317: Editor’s remarksAlyson J. K. Bail
Page 320 and 321: 302 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, THEIR REG
Page 346 and 347: 20. Iceland and the European Securi
Page 360 and 361:
342 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, THEIR REG
Page 362 and 363:
Page 364 and 365:
Page 366 and 367:
Page 368 and 369:
Page 370 and 371:
Page 372 and 373:
Page 374 and 375:
22. The Baltic states and security
Page 376 and 377:
Page 378 and 379:
Page 380 and 381:
Page 382 and 383:
23. Baltic perspectives on the Euro
Page 384 and 385:
Page 386 and 387:
Page 388 and 389:
Page 390 and 391:
Page 392 and 393:
Page 394 and 395:
Page 396 and 397:
Page 398 and 399:
Page 400 and 401:
Page 402 and 403:
Page 404 and 405:
Page 406 and 407:
Page 408 and 409:
Page 411 and 412:
AppendixExtracts from the Treaty Es
Page 413 and 414:
ments, to promote measures to satis
Page 415 and 416:
(c) strengthening systematic cooper
Page 417 and 418:
Article III-303The Union may conclu
Page 419 and 420:
shall carry out its tasks in liaiso
Page 421 and 422:
EU CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY 403enhance
Page 423 and 424:
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 405ning, Det 21.
Page 425 and 426:
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 407Karlis Neretni
Page 427 and 428:
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 409her publicatio
Page 429 and 430:
INDEX 411Atlanticism 364banking 357
Page 431 and 432:
INDEX 413Kosovo and 45Left Socialis
Page 433 and 434:
INDEX 415Counter-Terrorism Coordina
Page 435 and 436:
attle group 154, 181Central Union o
Page 437 and 438:
INDEX 419Iceland Defense Force 328,
Page 439 and 440:
INDEX 421Washington Declaration (19
Page 441 and 442:
INDEX 423NPT (Non-Proliferation Tre
Page 443 and 444:
ESDP and 12, 16, 19, 24, 54-55, 59,
Page 445:
INDEX 427Vienna Documents 236Viking
show all

The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?