The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

374 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, THEIR REGION AND EUROPEWest’s warning period of an attack has been expanded from 10 hours, as it wasduring the cold war period, to a comfortable 10 years. 43 It is not, therefore, aproblem for West European analysts if Russia’s defence remains structuredaccording to a cold war threat perception—against a military attack from theUSA and NATO. 44Furthermore, Russia is seen by West European analysts as a country wherestate institutions are weak and the armed forces have little legitimacy. 45 A truereform of the defence system is thus thought to be highly unlikely to succeed. 46Reform would require an assessment of the internal and external securitythreats to the country—both current and in the foreseeable future—and theorganization, training and equipping of the armed forces would have to bebased on proper threat assessment. 47 In Russia, however, elements of reformsuch as structural changes to the conscription system, professionalization of theforces, improvement of the defence management system, enhancement ofcapabilities and, above all, the introduction of proper civilian control of thearmed forces all seem far away. The West European conclusion is that Russia’sinternally praised defence reform is best likened to a Potemkin village: itappears impressive, but lacks substance. 48Much as Baltic security managers might agree with this assessment ofRussia’s failed reforms, they do not believe that Russia acts according to thelogic of a rational cost–benefit analysis. Nor do they put their faith in anystrong urge for democracy in a country that lacks civil society structures oreducation in the most basic democratic principles. Furthermore, they expressdoubts about how much the membership of the club of ‘civilized states’ reallymeans to President Putin.Baltic military analysts are not convinced that Russia lacks instruments topursue its imperial ambitions. First, they point out that such conclusions arebased on studies of the Russian armed forces, while Russia also has a security43 A recent report assumes a warning time of 1 month for invasion of the Baltic states, however.Larson, E. V. et al., Assuring Access in Key Strategic Regions: Toward a Long-Term Strategy (RANDCorporation: Santa Monica, Calif., Oct. 2004), URL .44 McDermott, R. N., ‘Putin’s military priorities: the modernization of the armed forces’, eds A. C.Aldis and R. N. McDermott, Russian Military Reform 1992–2002 (Frank Cass: London, 2003),pp. 260–77. McDermott concludes in this article that Russian military reform has taken a ‘dreamingapproach’ (p. 273).45 This view was expressed in guest lectures at the Baltic Defence College, including Kværnø, O.,department director, Royal Danish Military Academy, Copenhagen, Lecture at the seminar on Obstaclesand Possible Ways Ahead in Russian Military Reform, Baltic Defence College, Tartu, 22 Nov. 2004.46 Cottey, A., Edmunds, T. and Forster, A. (eds), Democratic Control of the Military in PostcommunistEurope: Guarding the Guards (Palgrave: London, 2002), in particular the editors’ Introduction, pp. 1–17.See also Karkoszka, A., ‘Defense reform in Poland 1989–2000’, eds I. Gyarmati and T. Winkler, Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States (Brassey’s: Washington,DC, 2002), pp. 165–88. These authors define true reforms as establishing effective democratic civiliancontrol over defence policy (Cottey et al.) and as actions which are undertaken with a clear purpose ofimproving the defence system, rather than merely adapting it to worsened economic conditions (Karkoszka).47 Donnelly, C. N., ‘Reshaping Russia’s armed forces: security requirements and institutionalresponses’, eds Aldis and McDermott (note 44), pp. 296–315.48 Kværnø (note 45).