The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

388 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, THEIR REGION AND EUROPEstrategic regions in time of crisis, including the Baltic states. 93 In one scenarioin this study Russia is preparing an invasion of the Baltic states, allegedly todefend its national minorities. The report openly discusses the related—andoften very sensitive—themes and issues ranging from the potential impact ofthe German peace movement to Poland’s poor roads and bridges. The messagethat the Baltic states’ hard security concerns are being treated by US analysts assomething more than ‘anger and suspicion towards their former oppressor’ hasa value going far beyond the study’s military conclusion that the Baltic statesare not—as many local military experts fear—in danger of being overrun withina few days because of lengthy EU decision making. The Baltic states’ perceptionthat the USA has a more sympathetic approach to them may owesomething to a number of other factors. One of them is a congruency of perspectivesbetween the USA and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on certain keyissues, such as a preference for interventionist foreign policy and a scepticalattitude towards multilateralism. 94 Finally, there is also the feeling that arelationship with the USA is beneficial for the Baltic states’ security vis-à-visother European states. 95 Perhaps most important of all, however, is the memoryof Western Europe’s passive attitude towards Baltic security needs in the 1990sand of what the Baltic states saw as a European tendency to refer them back toNATO and to the USA as the sole arbiters of their fate.Although the Baltic states may find it difficult to concentrate on any aspectsof security that go beyond the military factor, they do not discount the importanceof non-military security. The many references to other aspects of securityin their official documents indicate a growing awareness of non-militarythreats. The example of Latvia and its tendency to turn to the EU for socioeconomicsupport is indicative of developments in the region. It is difficult toenvisage the USA being able to assist directly on issues of economic, societal orenvironmental risks. Although each Baltic country’s threat perception differsslightly from the others and all three differ from other, West European membersof the EU, the instruments required to address these threats for Baltic purposeslie within the same range and are in fact available within the EU.The Nordic countries have earlier impressed the Baltic states, among others,by having the courage to remain faithful to their values; 96 by the attention theyhave paid to non-military aspects of security; and by the frankness of theirpublic debates. They could continue to be of assistance to the Baltic states93 Larson (note 43).94 See Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (note 9), section 1.2: ‘the ability of international organisationsto solve certain security problems has . . . not improved’.95 Observations on Poland adapted here to the Baltic states from Zaborowski, M., ‘From America’sprotégé to constructive European: Polish security policy in the twenty-first century’, Occasional Paperno. 56, EU Institute of Security Studies, Paris, Dec. 2004, URL .96 Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, then Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, was the driving force behind WesternEurope’s support for the Baltic states’ struggle for independence. See also Asmus, R. D., ‘The Atlanticalliance at a new crossroads: what does it mean for Denmark and northern Europe?’, eds P. Carlsen and H.Mouritzen, Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2004 (Danish Institute for International Studies: Copenhagen,2004), URL , pp. 26–48.