The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

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358 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, THEIR REGION AND EUROPEStockholmSWEDENÅland(Finland)FINLANDHelsinkiTallinnESTONIASt PetersburgRUSSIALATVIARigaBaltic SeaGdanskKaliningrad(Russia)POLANDLITHUANIAVilniusBELARUSMinskMap of the eastern Baltic Sea regioninstrumental in starting the Baltic Defence College in Tartu and still provide asubstantial proportion of the staff. 3 The fact that these activities are decliningnow, when the armed forces of the Baltic states have acquired enough competenceto run their own business, is quite natural and nothing to be sorry about.On the contrary; much of the cooperation is in fact continuing, but on a morenearly equal basis. Both Latvia and Lithuania are procuring ground-to-air missilesfrom Sweden, 4 the exchange of students in military schools continues,joint mine-clearing operations are conducted in the Baltic, and so on.III. Different outlooksWhy, then, with the extremely close connections between the countries in theBaltic Sea region, is it so hard to agree on questions concerning the ultimatethreats—those that endanger the very survival of the states in question? This3 In 2004, more than one-fifth of the staff of the Baltic Defence College come from Nordic countries:Denmark provided 3, Finland 1, Norway 2 and Sweden 4 staff members out of a total of 46.4 Latvia decided in Nov. 2004 to buy the RBS 70 short-range air defence missile system from theSwedish company Saab. Saab Group, ‘Another NATO country buys RBS 70’, Press release, 25 Nov.2005, URL . Lithuania has accepted a Norwegiandonation of the same type of missile but will buy the necessary maintenance and upgrades from Sweden.Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence, ‘Lithuanian airspace to be safeguarded by air defence armamentsdonated by Norway’, News release, Vilnius, 14 Nov. 2004, URL .
THE BALTIC STATES AND SECURITY IN NORTHERN EU ROP E 359seems especially strange when all the states are far too small to pursueindependent security policies of their own.The main reason for this lack of agreement is the way in which the Balticstates (and to some extent also Finland and Poland) perceive Russia. Alternatively,to put it the other way round, the way in which Sweden, Germany andothers do not perceive Russia. For the Baltic states, Russia is a threat when itcomes to both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security. This remains the case regardless ofwhat the rest of the region (or the rest of Europe) may or may not think.It would be quite extraordinary, in fact, if the 50-year occupation of the Balticstates had not affected the collective memory of the people. Earlier periods ofRussian occupation are also a part of this heritage; especially during the latterpart of the 19th century, when the government in St Petersburg pursued a harsh‘Russification’ policy. National identities in all the Baltic states are stronglylinked with their emancipation from Russia. Anything emanating from Russiathat could be interpreted as a threat to their freedom or culture will be treatedwith great suspicion.Developments in Russia during recent years have in no way lessened the concernsabout Russian intentions. Approximately 70 per cent of the members ofthe Russian Parliament belong to parties that have a nationalistic agenda. 5 This,combined with Russia’s reluctance to ratify border treaties with Estonia andLatvia, Russian pressure on the Baltic states to join the 1990 Treaty on ConventionalArmed Forces in Europe, 6 and harsh rhetoric concerning how Estoniaand Latvia are handling their Russian-speaking minorities, 7 serves to keep theirsuspicion alive. The 2003 Russian military doctrine has also contributed to amore sinister interpretation of Russia’s intentions and of how it could use Russianminorities in other countries as a pretext for military or other actions. Thedoctrine states that a task of the Russian armed forces is to safeguard Russianeconomic and political interests, which includes ‘ensuring the security of Russiancitizens in the zones of armed conflicts and political or other forms ofinstability’. 8Taken together, all this makes military security an important part of the overallsecurity policy of the Baltic states. Consequently, if the EU does not becomea credible military alliance with a real war-fighting capability, the Baltic stateswill do everything they can to make NATO—and especially the USA—a part5 Winiarski, M., ‘Hela makten i Putins händer’ [All power in Putin’s hands], Dagens Nyheter, 19 Dec.2003.6 Larsson, R. L., ‘Vad vill egentligen Ryssland med CFE?’ [What does Russia really want with the CFETreaty?], Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademien Handlingar och Tidskrift—The Royal Swedish Academy ofWar Sciences Proceedings and Journal, no. 5, vol. 208 (2004), pp. 59–67. See also Lachowski, Z., TheAdapted CFE Treaty and the Admission of the Baltic States to NATO, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 1 (SIPRI:Stockholm, Dec. 2002), URL .7 Russians accounted for 25.6% of the population of Estonia in 2001 and 32.5% of the population ofLatvia in 1997. Turner, B. (ed.), The Statesman’s Yearbook 2005 (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke,2004), pp. 600, 1037.8 Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation, The Priority Tasks of the Development of the ArmedForces of the Russian Federation (Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation: Moscow, 2003), URL, p. 63.
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THE NORDICCOUNTRIES ANDTHE EUROPEAN
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Alyson J. K. Bailes (United Kingdom
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The Nordic Countries andthe Europea
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The Nordic Countries andthe Europea
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ContentsPrefacexiiAbbreviations and
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CONTENTSII. The European security c
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CONTENTSII. The small arms and ligh
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CONTENTSII. Iceland and the emergen
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PREFACEThe conference on the Nordic
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2 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND THE ESDP
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10 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND THE ESD
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Editor’s remarksGunilla HerolfPar
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EDITOR’S REMARKS 31which the vari
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EDITOR’S REMARKS 33mark as well s
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EDITOR’S REMARKS 35The Europeaniz
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1. Denmark and the European Securit
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 39European def
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 41safely leave
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 43motions to t
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 45effective
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 47connected an
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52 INSTITUTIONAL AND NATIONAL POLIT
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100 INSTITUTIONAL AND NATIONAL POLI
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Part IINational defence and Europea
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114 THE BROADER DIMENSIONS OF SECUR
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6. The impact of EU capability targ
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CAPABILITY TARGETS AND OPERATIONAL
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7. The impact of EU capability targ
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THE CASE OF SWEDEN 143Government ha
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THE CASE OF SWEDEN 145immediate reg
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THE CASE OF SWEDEN 147SAF Headquart
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THE CASE OF SWEDEN 149the navy will
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‘NOT ONLY, BUT ALSO NORDIC’ 151
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9. Hardware politics, ‘hard polit
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HARDWARE POLITICS 169Sweden’s sec
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HARDWARE POLITICS 171the exploitati
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HARDWARE POLITICS 173share of Finla
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HARDWARE POLITICS 175and procuremen
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HARDWARE POLITICS 177of internation
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HARDWARE POLITICS 179reluctant to a
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HARDWARE POLITICS 181EU ambitions a
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HARDWARE POLITICS 183Nordic armamen
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10. The Nordic attitude to and role
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DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL COLLABORATION 18
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Part IIINordic handling of the broa
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13. The Nordic countries and conven
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14. Nordic nuclear non-proliferatio
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16. Muddling through: how the EU is
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Editor’s remarksAlyson J. K. Bail
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302 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, THEIR REG
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Page 411 and 412: AppendixExtracts from the Treaty Es
Page 413 and 414: ments, to promote measures to satis
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Page 421 and 422: EU CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY 403enhance
Page 423 and 424: ABOUT THE AUTHORS 405ning, Det 21.
Page 425 and 426: ABOUT THE AUTHORS 407Karlis Neretni
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS 409her publicatio
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INDEX 411Atlanticism 364banking 357
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INDEX 413Kosovo and 45Left Socialis
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INDEX 415Counter-Terrorism Coordina
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attle group 154, 181Central Union o
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INDEX 419Iceland Defense Force 328,
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INDEX 421Washington Declaration (19
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INDEX 423NPT (Non-Proliferation Tre
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ESDP and 12, 16, 19, 24, 54-55, 59,
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INDEX 427Vienna Documents 236Viking
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