The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

64 INSTITUTIONAL AND NATIONAL POLITICSParliament in September 2004. 48 In this document, the government softened thesignificance of the Constitutional Treaty’s security guarantees by stating thatthe situation in the EU was already compatible with security guarantees: it washighly unlikely that any member state would ignore an armed attack againstanother. The government thus made it look as if no change had taken place inthe relationship between Swedish non-alignment and the ESDP. In general,there seems to be less preparedness in Swedish political circles than in Finnishones to reconsider the meaning and appropriateness of the position of nonalignmentin EU conditions.If the Swedish defence White Paper took a cautious position regarding theinterpretation of the EU’s security guarantees, in another respect it signalled a‘European’ orientation that could be seen as rather novel in the Swedish context.In the White Paper, the government emphasized the role of the USA andNATO in European security but treated a strong and unitary EU as a preconditionfor a functioning transatlantic relationship. This position clearlyrelates to the EU’s emerging crisis management capacity, to which Sweden isstrongly committed for both political and military reasons. The White Paperclearly indicates that the EU is becoming the most important channel forSwedish participation in international operations—a form of military action thathas become the key emphasis of Swedish military strategy. The governmentthus confirmed Sweden’s intention to participate in the EU’s rapid reactionforces and in the EDA.The constructive position that Denmark took towards the deepening of theESDP in the Convention confirmed the change of attitude that had beendeveloping in the country since the launch of the St Malo process. Support forthe reinforcement of the ESDP has been increasing in Danish political parties,and the government took a positive attitude towards the new ESDP provisionsin the Intergovernmental Conference negotiations of 2003–2004. Governmentalstatements clearly indicate that the Danish Government no longer sees a contradictionbetween the growing role of EU security and defence policy and transatlanticcooperation. In this sense, both Denmark and Sweden seem to havegradually adjusted themselves to the change that has taken place in the UK’ssecurity policy thinking. For Denmark, however, this does not mean that it isquestioning its own Atlanticist position; rather, it indicates the emergence of astrengthened European dimension in parallel with it. Danish Atlanticism hasclearly become more flexible, but the limits of this flexibility will not andcannot be tested as long as Danish participation in the ESDP is restricted.Set against these changes in Danish policy, the opt-out from the EU’s defencepolicy has become a clear constraint for the nation—a point which has regularlybeen made by the government in connection with recent ESDP developments. 4948 Swedish Government, ‘Vårt framtida försvar’ [Our future defence], Regeringens proposition 2004/05:5, Riksdag, Stockholm, 23 Sep. 2004 URL . See alsochapter 7 in this volume.49 E.g., a Danish government document states that: ‘Denmark should actively take part in the work tocreate the framework for the new enlarged EU. But the dynamism in the EU’s development will in the