The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

BALTIC PERSPECTIVES 367national security remains protection of the autonomous nation state and its territory,features that are related to the definition of a ‘modern state’ and are linkedwith a focus on military security and state borders as lines of closure. Thisdefinition of security also reflects the understanding of national security amonglarge segments of the societies of the Baltic states. 11Nevertheless, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have joined the EU. The memberstates of the EU are heading towards another definition of national security anda post-Westphalian form of international relations. Their security agendasaddress a postmodern world in which classic threats are exchanged for newones: threats to the stability of global economic and environmental systems andto openness to the international system. 12 Postmodern states are no longergoverned by the territorial imperative. They are embedded in an internationalframework in which the distinction between domestic and international hasbeen eroded, where borders matter less and where force is prohibited. 13 Adilemma in relation to the ESDP is that, while protection of democracy and themarket economy as such is supported by the EU, the protection of national territoriesis not an issue for the ESDP. Although there is substantial overlapbetween the Baltic and EU visions, the EU is aiming higher in its definition ofsecurity, seeking to build ‘an area of freedom, security, and justice with respectfor fundamental rights’. 14III. Definitions and perceptions of threatDespite their modernist definitions of security, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuaniaapply a postmodern definition of threats. Terrorism, trafficking and other formsof organized crime—issues which do not affect state security directly—are atthe top of their lists while issues with a direct impact on sovereignty and territorialintegrity—such as military conflict—are assumed to be unlikely in contemporaryEurope. Lithuania’s National Security Strategy does not even contemplatethe contingency of a military attack from another state. 15 Estonia andLatvia do not totally preclude the occurrence of military conflicts in the regionbut rely on the prevailing power structure in Europe as a guarantee againstinvasion.11 E.g., in 2003 the Estonian public’s perceptions of what guaranteed Estonia’s national security were:NATO membership (52%); good relations with Russia (45%); Baltic defence cooperation (36%); strongnational defence (33%); economic prosperity in the world (33%); membership of the EU (31%); strongborder control (19%); strong national feelings/patriotism (16%); neutrality policy (15%); and high standardof living (13%). More than one option could be selected. Estonian Ministry of Defence, Avalik Arvamusja Riigikaitse 2000–2003 [Society and national defence 2000–2003] (Eesti Vabariigi Kaitseministeerium:Tallinn, 2003), URL , table 4, p. 7.12 Buzan, B. and Wæver, O., Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, CambridgeStudies in International Relations no. 91 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003), p. 24.13 Cooper, R. quoted in Kaldor, M., Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (Polity Press: Oxford,2003), p. 136.14 Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, European Convention, Brussels, 18 July 2003,URL , Article III-158(1) and (3).15 Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence (note 9), chapter 4.