The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

382 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, THEIR REGION AND EUROPEwill lead not to coherent capability development, but to a situation where theythemselves are torn between different loyalties. 78Although training and equipment for participation in the NATO ResponseForce and the EU battle groups should be the same—since the ESDP is supposedto adhere to NATO standards and doctrine whenever possible—Balticsecurity managers foresee the differences that will occur. They argue that, if forno other reason, these differences will occur because ‘the standards might bethe same but will not be identical’ when the NATO Response Force has morethan 20 000 troops while the EU battle groups each have 1500. The consequentdifferences in demands to be met by contributors will also affect force interoperabilityand compliance with NATO standards.For Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the proximate problem has been to findpartners for a battle group formation and decide whether to create a new battlegroup or to join an existing one. At stake are both the capabilities they can offerand more subjective issues of compatibility. When looking for partners, asLatvia and Lithuania were doing in late 2004, it is important to ensure coordinationwith NATO, internal coherence, interoperability and a similar mentality.The limited ‘niche’ capabilities offered by each Baltic state must fit into thestructure of the battle group in question. The Baltic states are concerned that theprinciple of a ‘single set of forces’ might be ignored if the training and developmentof forces and the terms of availability are not coordinated over the longterm with NATO. Without proper coordination the bigger countries that canafford to have two sets of forces, one for NATO and another for the ESDP, willchoose this option. Some of these countries’ forces will thus be trained to meetthe specific needs of the ESDP and others the needs of NATO. At the sametime, forces from the smaller countries will need to be trained for both NATOand ESDP purposes, but they will never be adequately adapted to either ofthem.Transparency is another principle that is supposed to guide ESDP–NATOcooperation, in order to promote the coherent provision of forces to both. Situationsmay be envisaged where battle group forces which are also earmarkedfor the NATO Response Force are urgently required by both institutions, anddecisions on where to engage the forces must be coordinated between NATOand ESDP. It is precisely decision making that the Baltic states perceive as theEU’s Achilles heel. ‘It is very difficult to reach any agreement because it seemsmore important who is going to take orders from whom’, was a commentarising from Baltic frustration on the EU battle groups.Another problem is that of mentality: ‘Multinational forces look very good onpaper. But out there you need to cooperate, to understand each other. Our forcesneed to accept commanders from another nation.’ It is widely known that theLatvian forces in Iraq did not feel comfortable working under Polish command,and a separation into two different camps was the result. Military leadership by78 Interviews (note 1). The problem of follow-up standards and procedures is not limited to the ESDP;it is also frequently discussed within NATO.