The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

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232 THE BROADER DIMENSIONS OF SECURITYsecurity policy terms, Norway wants to contribute to peace and stability in theworld and sees itself as having a fundamental moral obligation to promotehuman rights and peace globally. Thus, humanitarian considerations also guidethe country’s foreign policy. Mediation, support for peace processes and thefocused use of development assistance are also tools for international crisismanagement in Norway’s foreign policy discourse. 50In addition to Norwegian diplomats working as mediators in regional andinternational organizations, the cases of the Middle East and Sri Lanka demonstrateanother—alternative—type of small state mediation. In the ‘Oslo BackChannel’, Norwegian researcher Terje Rød-Larsen was able to get the Israelisand Palestinians involved in a Norwegian-mediated peace process in the early1990s. A set of secret meetings took place in Norway, partly outside the officialdiplomatic structures. Rød-Larsen’s methods—and those of his team includingMona Juul, Jan Egeland and Johan Jørgen Holst—for facilitating dialogue werebased on small group psychology: he believed that a sociological approach toconflict resolution—where the parties could discuss openly and share theirfeelings and emotions—would allow trust to be built at a personal level.Another important role played by the Norwegians was the role of messenger,delivering information and bringing reassurance during uncertain phases ofmediation. Although the Norwegians wanted to emphasize their facilitativerole, the role changed into more active mediation during the process. As mediators,they suggested compromise formulae and mediated between divergingpositions. 51In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, Erik Solheim, the special envoy of the NorwegianGovernment, engaged in exploratory visits comparable to prenegotiations.In December 2001 the new Sri Lankan Prime Minister, RanilWickremasinghe, wrote to the Norwegian Prime Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik,asking Norway to continue its facilitation of the peace process. That wasfollowed by a similar request from the leader of the Liberation Tigers of TamilEelam (LTTE). Vidar Helgesen, Norway’s Deputy Foreign Minister, chairedsix rounds of talks between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE. The twosides signed a ceasefire agreement in February 2002, and the NorwegianGovernment is currently working in Sri Lanka to maintain the contact betweenthe parties. The role of the Norwegian third party in Sri Lanka is closer to thatof facilitator than mediator. A significant part of Norway’s efforts are focusedon facilitating understanding and communication between the parties in order tominimize misunderstandings. Norway’s intervention in Sri Lanka is based onits long-term involvement in the region, the provision of facilitation without50 Koivula (note 49), pp. 21–23; Riste (note 48); and Vollebæk, K., Norwegian Minister of Foreignaffairs, ‘The transformation of European security: new challenges for Norway’, Speech, Oslo MilitarySociety, 9 Nov. 1998, URL .51 For a critical, detailed account see Waage, H. H., ‘Peacemaking is a Risky Business’: Norway’s Rolein the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1993–96, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)Report 1/2004 (PRIO: Oslo, 2004).
‘THE HIGHER CAUSE OF PEACE’ 233being a party to negotiations, humanitarian assistance for confidence buildingand reconciliation, and secrecy and discretion. 52What makes Norwegian facilitation/mediation interesting is that it consists ofelements from both official mediation and track-two diplomacy. Furthermore,Norway has made this role something of a trademark in its foreign policy. InNorway, academics, NGOs and the foreign policy establishment have foundways to work together in conflict mediation. This seems to be happening less inFinland and Sweden.VIII. ConclusionsIt is argued in this chapter that adding mediation to the ESDP and adding it tothe European Union’s four priority areas of civilian crisis management—police,rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection—would help to bridgethe gap between conflict prevention and crisis management that is one of thecore features of the European Security Strategy. Mediation is a tool that can beused to bridge the gap because it can be employed at different phases of theconflict cycle. It is a flexible instrument for conflict resolution and can be usedby a variety of actors.The EU is often perceived to be a biased mediator and, therefore, is notalways accepted as a partner for political dialogue. It is internally divided andhas had difficulties in formulating shared positions on actual violent conflicts.Nor has it always had carrots to offer and sticks to use, as in cases where itmediates with a specific outcome in view. The lack of means leads easily to adeficit in its credibility, and possibly in its efficiency too. Therefore, alternativeand complementary mediation frameworks are needed to add a new element tothe ESDP.Post-Clausewitzean conflicts are often driven by such fundamental issues asthe identity of the parties and the survival of those identities, and alternativemeans for conflict resolution which are capable of tackling these ‘existential’concerns are needed. In other words, processes parallel to official diplomacyare needed because they can support official diplomacy by offering a frameworkfor the search for innovative solutions. Norway has managed to combinethe methods of alternative dispute resolution with its official diplomacy, andhas thereby brought a new and special element into small state mediation. It hasmaintained its standing as an impartial, neutral, facilitative, non-judgmental anddiagnostic third party, and its facilitation services are in demand in many differentparts of the world. It could, therefore, provide a model for Swedish andFinnish mediation within the EU context too. That would mean, however, thatthese countries should insist on adding mediation to the Union’s four priorityareas of civilian crisis management, and should be ready to work more closelywith the relevant academics and NGOs.52 Moolakkattu, J., ‘Norway’s peace facilitation in Sri Lanka’, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 40, no. 4(forthcoming, 2005).
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THE NORDICCOUNTRIES ANDTHE EUROPEAN
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Alyson J. K. Bailes (United Kingdom
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The Nordic Countries andthe Europea
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The Nordic Countries andthe Europea
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ContentsPrefacexiiAbbreviations and
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CONTENTSII. The European security c
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CONTENTSII. The small arms and ligh
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CONTENTSII. Iceland and the emergen
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PREFACEThe conference on the Nordic
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2 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND THE ESDP
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10 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND THE ESD
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Editor’s remarksGunilla HerolfPar
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EDITOR’S REMARKS 31which the vari
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EDITOR’S REMARKS 33mark as well s
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EDITOR’S REMARKS 35The Europeaniz
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1. Denmark and the European Securit
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 39European def
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 41safely leave
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 43motions to t
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 45effective
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 47connected an
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52 INSTITUTIONAL AND NATIONAL POLIT
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100 INSTITUTIONAL AND NATIONAL POLI
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Part IINational defence and Europea
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114 THE BROADER DIMENSIONS OF SECUR
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6. The impact of EU capability targ
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CAPABILITY TARGETS AND OPERATIONAL
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7. The impact of EU capability targ
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THE CASE OF SWEDEN 143Government ha
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THE CASE OF SWEDEN 145immediate reg
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THE CASE OF SWEDEN 147SAF Headquart
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THE CASE OF SWEDEN 149the navy will
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‘NOT ONLY, BUT ALSO NORDIC’ 151
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9. Hardware politics, ‘hard polit
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HARDWARE POLITICS 169Sweden’s sec
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HARDWARE POLITICS 171the exploitati
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HARDWARE POLITICS 173share of Finla
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HARDWARE POLITICS 175and procuremen
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HARDWARE POLITICS 177of internation
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HARDWARE POLITICS 179reluctant to a
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Page 211: Part IIINordic handling of the broa
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16. Muddling through: how the EU is
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Editor’s remarksAlyson J. K. Bail
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302 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, THEIR REG
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20. Iceland and the European Securi
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22. The Baltic states and security
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23. Baltic perspectives on the Euro
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AppendixExtracts from the Treaty Es
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ments, to promote measures to satis
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(c) strengthening systematic cooper
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Article III-303The Union may conclu
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shall carry out its tasks in liaiso
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EU CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY 403enhance
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS 405ning, Det 21.
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS 407Karlis Neretni
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS 409her publicatio
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INDEX 411Atlanticism 364banking 357
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INDEX 413Kosovo and 45Left Socialis
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INDEX 415Counter-Terrorism Coordina
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attle group 154, 181Central Union o
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INDEX 419Iceland Defense Force 328,
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INDEX 421Washington Declaration (19
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INDEX 423NPT (Non-Proliferation Tre
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ESDP and 12, 16, 19, 24, 54-55, 59,
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INDEX 427Vienna Documents 236Viking
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