The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

BALTIC PERSPECTIVES 389today. The situation has, of course, changed since EU and NATO enlargementin 2004: in some aspects of security cooperation the Nordic countries have beenovertaken by the Baltic states, now organizationally embedded in both NATOand EU. The ESDP could, nevertheless, be a route for a revival of Baltic andBaltic–Nordic cooperation. After an enthusiastic period when many joint Balticdefence and security projects were supported by external advisers, the policydistance between Estonia and Lithuania is now endangering the continuation ofseveral of them. The withdrawal of Nordic and other foreign advisers, justifiedby the argument that the Baltic states are now members of the EU and NATO,also bodes ill for trilateral cooperation projects. 97 The rush towards ‘Baltification’has ignored the fact that there is no such thing as a Baltic identity and thatit takes time to adopt the skills of international and, in particular, regionalcooperation, just as it took time for the Baltic states to acquire the skills of EUcompromise. Thus, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are in the process of beingsplit by the strong attention they are paying to their different roots and nationalidentities: Nordic, Baltic and Central European, respectively. Should all theNordic countries decide to engage in NATO and the ESDP, with Denmarkabandoning its opt-outs, they might be able to offer a new framework for Balticinvolvement in the ESDP’s civilian and military instruments, as well as aframework for security cooperation between the Baltic states themselves. Muchof the security-related activities remaining under the umbrella of the EU aresupposed in the first instance to take place within a sub-region, between countriesbordering each other. The Baltic states’ concern from the period beforeNATO and EU enlargement that such initiatives might be used as obstacles toand replacements for full-scale membership is now no longer relevant.Countries cannot move to another place if they dislike their neighbours; butthey can re-shape their geo-strategic position by changing their relations withthem. Poland has done so in relation to Germany. 98 The Baltic states couldachieve the same in relation to Russia. A Baltic–Russian security communitysounds far-fetched, but would be much better than the prevailing tensions.Germany and Poland have already gained experience with each other; andPoland’s experience in building security communities with its former foesGermany and Ukraine, and with Lithuania was of key importance for thestanding it gained vis-à-vis Western countries in the 1990s especially. Poland isnow deeply involved in further building of its security community with Ukraineand has ambitions to be a regional leader. Lithuania, in the same spirit, ismaintaining good relations with Russia over—or despite—the Kaliningradexclave. Germany, meanwhile, continues to shy away from its potential role asa regional player despite numerous calls for it to become involved in the sub-97 The projects still active are the Baltic Defence College, the Baltic Battalion, the Baltic Naval Squadronand the Baltic Air Surveillance Network.98 Kuzniar, R. (ed.), Poland’s Security Policy 1989–2000 (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar: Warsaw,2001).