The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

13. The Nordic countries and conventionalarms control: the case of small arms andlight weaponsNicholas Marsh*I. Introduction and historical backgroundDuring the cold war, Northern Europe was the scene of one of the continent’slargest and most asymmetric build-ups of conventional weaponry. The SovietUnion concentrated a significant part of its conventional strength—ground, airand naval forces—and also of its strategic nuclear capacity on the Kola Peninsulaand in the Leningrad Military District. Through its Warsaw Pact partnersthe Soviet Union controlled the southern shore of the Baltic Sea as well as theintra-German border. On the Western side, there was no direct match for thislocalized massing of power. If strategic balance was maintained, it was essentiallyby means of the overall capacity (especially nuclear and naval) of theUSA and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization rather than by any crediblecounterweight in the Nordic region. As a result of special arrangements withNATO, the allied nations Denmark and Norway did not even have foreignforces or nuclear equipment stationed on their territory in peacetime. Finlandand Sweden were neutral (or ‘non-aligned’) states with forces proportionateonly to their own territorial needs. Moreover, of these four nations, onlySweden had a defence industry on an internationally competitive scale. 1Paradoxes of Nordic arms control and disarmament policyThis was a situation in which the region’s responsible or vulnerable statesmight be expected to have had a keen interest in arms control and disarmament.Indeed, the Nordic states—and to a certain extent Poland—consistently supportedthe cause of nuclear disarmament. 2 They were among the foremost inencouraging steps and hosting events, such as the 1972–75 Helsinki negotiationson a conference on security and cooperation in Europe, designed to promoteinter-bloc cooperation and the lowering of military tensions in general.The same logic did not, however, apply to the adoption of concrete arms control1 See chapters 9 and 10 in this volume.2 See chapter 14 in this volume.* Section I of this chapter was co-authored with Zdzislaw Lachowski, SIPRI. Research assistancewas provided by Joop de Haan, SIPRI.