The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

EDITOR’S REMARKS 35The Europeanization process that is reflected in all the chapters of this part is thustaking place, as the Nordic countries see it, in a framework which the EU will notdominate. This does not exclude the growth of an increasing sense of European closeness,based on rational calculations—such as those embodied in Miles’ concept ofperformance fusion—which will also lead in the direction of increased integration overtime. To take just one instance, Sweden’s declaration in 2004 that it was hard toimagine that it would be neutral in case of an attack against an EU country is a big stepfor a non-aligned country. Finland’s policy formulations have been similarly farreachingon many occasions; and the same goes for a number of Danish politicianswho are eager to abandon the opt-outs.These genuinely important developments may, however, still be far less far-reachingthan others in Europe would and will expect. As Alyson Bailes writes in her introductionto this volume, the ESDP might at any time take a fuite en avant, led by countriesthat are more used to federalist ideology (or to the practice of collective defence)and would see such a development as natural. The question is under what conditionsthe Nordic policies might change to accommodate to this.Some factors are already problematic for the Nordic approaches. For example, theprocedure of compensating for lack of institutional involvement by engagement inactivity works better for a large country like the United Kingdom, whose militaryresources are very large. A small country might contribute proportionately more interms of its own overall security capacities without anyone noticing, whereby the messageand the intended balancing effect are lost.Another factor that might make Nordic countries prone to change their policies is thefact that institutional membership for small countries might be seen as a necessity forinfluence. All the Nordic countries, being internationally minded, are eager to have animpact in the world. To the extent that this is denied to institutional ‘outsiders’, theywill be increasingly motivated to join in ‘core’ and ‘mainstream’ processes. However,the propensity to join for this reason is lessened by the awareness of the fact that, intoday’s world, influence is related more to size than to membership.Furthermore, it is possible to imagine an external event of a kind that would make itadvantageous for the non-aligned to join NATO, for Denmark to abandon its opt-outsor for Norway to join the EU. Much of Europe’s progress in general has been spurredby unexpected happenings. Nordic positions at present might seem to be fairly wellcemented: but just as the Nordic countries have continuously adjusted to events anddevelopments thus far—if not in institutional affiliations, then very often in policyterms—they will most likely do so again, should unexpected events demonstrate theneed for it.As seen from the Nordic countries, the EU and Europe are—in Miles’ terminology—theresults of compound fusion, involving institutions and countries workingalongside each other. The Nordic countries do not see the EU as a monolith of countriesunited in a common approach to all issues. Austria and Ireland also remain nonaligned;the UK is outside the Eurozone and this is not likely to change for some time;and France and Germany are among the countries that do not fulfil the criteria of theStability and Growth Pact. The heterogeneity is vast also among those considered to bein the core of the EU, and all countries have their blemishes.As an overall conclusion, it can be posited that any move by the Nordic countriestowards more integrationist policies will stem from two particular developments: arational decision-making process based on concern about lack of influence; and a