The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

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230 THE BROADER DIMENSIONS OF SECURITYFinnish mediationFinnish mediation follows a pattern similar to Swedish mediation, although theforeign policy traditions of these countries differ. Unlike Sweden, Finland didnot engage in criticism of, for example, oppressive regimes during the cold war.Urho Kekkonen, president 1956–81, characterized Finns as ‘physicians ratherthan judges’, whose task was not to pass judgment but to diagnose and cure.Finnish neutrality was justified by arguing that it offered a way to stay out ofthe conflicts between the great powers. Finland was seen to be somewherebetween East and West and therefore was assumed to have a capacity for bridgebuilding to ease international tensions. In the Finnish foreign policy narrative,Finland’s cautious policy towards the Soviet Union was rationalized by arguingthat it is was an expression of sheer pragmatism given Finland’s geopoliticalposition. 46Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland has emphasized that itbelongs to the ‘West European family’. This has allowed Finland to depict itselfas a moral actor in world politics. The Finnish Government’s most recent securityand defence policy report to the parliament states that: ‘Finland’s line ofaction is based on credible national defence, the functioning of society and aconsistent foreign policy as well as a strong international position and an activeparticipation as a member of European Union.’ 47 Finland is described as ‘a militarilynon-allied country’ that engages in crisis management outside militaryalliances. A strong focus in the report is on conflict prevention, and the use ofboth civilian and military action in crisis management is recommended.Several Finns have been used by international organizations to monitor,mediate and report on international crises and post-conflict transition periods.Martti Ahtisaari, president in 1994–2000, headed the UN’s monitoring ofNamibia’s transition to independence in 1989–90. Ahtisaari was a chief architectof the Kosovo peace plan in June 1999. He undertook this mission at therequest of the US and Russian governments, which had come to the conclusionthat only a third party not hitherto involved in the conflict could get SlobodanMilosevic, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to surrender to thewill of the international community. In May 2000 Ahtisaari was appointedalong with Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa to head the inspections of the armsdumps of the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. Ahtisaari is currentlya head of the Crisis Management Initiative, an organization which offers, interalia, mediation services internationally, and in early 2005 he presided overpeace talks in Helsinki between the Indonesian Government and rebels from theprovince of Aceh. From 1995 to 1998 Finland’s former Prime Minister HarriHolkeri was a member of the International Body, set up by the governments of46 See, e.g., Browning (note 43), pp. 47–72.47 Finnish Prime Minister’s Office, Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004, Government Reportno. 6/2004 (Prime Minister’s Office: Helsinki, 2004), URL , p. 78.
‘THE HIGHER CAUSE OF PEACE’ 231the United Kingdom and Ireland to provide an independent assessment of theissue of decommissioning illegal weapons in Northern Ireland. He was also oneof three independent chairmen of the multiparty peace negotiations in NorthernIreland. In June 2004 the UN Secretary-General appointed Holkeri as hisSpecial Representative for Kosovo. Former Finnish Defence Minister ElisabethRehn was UN Special Rapporteur for the Situation of Human Rights in Bosniaand Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslaviaand the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 1995–98 and UN Under-Secretary-General and Special Representative of the Secretary-General inBosnia and Herzegovina in 1998–99. She was a chairperson of the Democracyand Human Rights Table of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in2003.Norwegian mediationIf Finland’s and Sweden’s mediation profiles are rather similar to each other—experienced diplomats working for international organizations—the case ofNorway is different. In Norway’s foreign policy tradition there has been a longcoexistence of two different orientations: a view that emphasizes Norway’sgeopolitical position and a view that lays stress on Norway’s global responsibilityin matters concerning conflict prevention, conflict resolution and postconflictrestructuring. According to Olav Riste, there were three formativeperiods in the evolution of Norwegian foreign policy: ‘1905–1910, when the“classic” Norwegian neutralism took shape; the inter-war period, when Norwaywrapped herself in the mantle of a missionary for international law and disarmament;and the 1940s during which the country allied itself with greatpowers and became an active participant in international power politics’. 48Norway’s NATO membership shaped the discourse on security and defenceissues, and ‘Atlanticism’ was widely accepted as the main way of framingNorway’s position. 49The Norwegian foreign policy narrative was re-shaped after the breakdown ofthe cold war international system. Norway now wanted to also anchor its securitypolicy to the European security arrangements. The tendency to emphasizeNorway’s ‘ethical foreign policy’ strengthened. Norway perceives itself todayas a ‘humanitarian great power’ and a ‘player in international efforts for peaceand security’. Norway’s Foreign Minister, Knut Vollebæk, stated in 1998 thatNorway’s participation in peacekeeping operations and international crisismanagement is an integral part of the country’s foreign and security policy. In48 Riste, O., ‘Facing the 21st century: new and old dilemmas in Norwegian foreign policy’, SecurityPolicy Library no. 13-2001, Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Oslo, 2001, URL , p. 5.49 Koivula, T. Sodan kaikuja: Norjan ja Suomen henkilömiinaretoriikka kansainvälisten mediaprosessienilmentäjänä [Voices of war: the Norwegian and Finnish landmine rhetorics and the internationalmedia processes], Studia politica Tamperensis no. 12 (University of Tampere: Tampere, 2004),URL , pp. 19–21; and Riste (note 48).
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THE NORDICCOUNTRIES ANDTHE EUROPEAN
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Alyson J. K. Bailes (United Kingdom
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The Nordic Countries andthe Europea
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The Nordic Countries andthe Europea
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ContentsPrefacexiiAbbreviations and
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CONTENTSII. The European security c
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CONTENTSII. The small arms and ligh
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CONTENTSII. Iceland and the emergen
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PREFACEThe conference on the Nordic
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2 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND THE ESDP
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10 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND THE ESD
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Editor’s remarksGunilla HerolfPar
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EDITOR’S REMARKS 31which the vari
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EDITOR’S REMARKS 33mark as well s
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EDITOR’S REMARKS 35The Europeaniz
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1. Denmark and the European Securit
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 39European def
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 41safely leave
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 43motions to t
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 45effective
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DENMARK AND THE ESDP 47connected an
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52 INSTITUTIONAL AND NATIONAL POLIT
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100 INSTITUTIONAL AND NATIONAL POLI
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Part IINational defence and Europea
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114 THE BROADER DIMENSIONS OF SECUR
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6. The impact of EU capability targ
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CAPABILITY TARGETS AND OPERATIONAL
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7. The impact of EU capability targ
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THE CASE OF SWEDEN 143Government ha
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THE CASE OF SWEDEN 145immediate reg
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THE CASE OF SWEDEN 147SAF Headquart
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THE CASE OF SWEDEN 149the navy will
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‘NOT ONLY, BUT ALSO NORDIC’ 151
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9. Hardware politics, ‘hard polit
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HARDWARE POLITICS 169Sweden’s sec
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HARDWARE POLITICS 171the exploitati
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HARDWARE POLITICS 173share of Finla
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HARDWARE POLITICS 175and procuremen
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HARDWARE POLITICS 177of internation
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Page 211: Part IIINordic handling of the broa
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16. Muddling through: how the EU is
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Editor’s remarksAlyson J. K. Bail
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302 THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, THEIR REG
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20. Iceland and the European Securi
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22. The Baltic states and security
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23. Baltic perspectives on the Euro
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AppendixExtracts from the Treaty Es
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ments, to promote measures to satis
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(c) strengthening systematic cooper
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Article III-303The Union may conclu
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shall carry out its tasks in liaiso
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EU CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY 403enhance
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS 405ning, Det 21.
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS 407Karlis Neretni
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS 409her publicatio
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INDEX 411Atlanticism 364banking 357
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INDEX 413Kosovo and 45Left Socialis
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INDEX 415Counter-Terrorism Coordina
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attle group 154, 181Central Union o
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INDEX 419Iceland Defense Force 328,
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INDEX 421Washington Declaration (19
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INDEX 423NPT (Non-Proliferation Tre
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ESDP and 12, 16, 19, 24, 54-55, 59,
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INDEX 427Vienna Documents 236Viking
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