The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

BALTIC PERSPECTIVES 387The EU is not alone in needing courage on the issue of Russia. Baltic securitymanagers also need to decide whether there is any purpose in avoiding explicitmention of Russia in their security policy guidelines when so many hiddenreferences to it are made in the same documents. How sensible is it to requirethe same skill from their societies in 2005 that were basic for every newspaperreader in Soviet times: the ability to read between the lines? Even if Russia isnot mentioned as a threat, it is still mentioned when internal support for theESDP and NATO has to be mobilized. The argument about the price of solidarity—‘ifwe want to get support in time of crisis . . .’—sounds to many in theBaltic states like a reference to the ‘threat from Russia’. Frankly addressing thehard and soft security considerations related to Russia is likely to stir up heateddiscussions in the Baltic societies, but public debate is paramount in the formulationof security policy.Having obtained membership of NATO and the EU, the Baltic states nowlack a ‘grand target’. After an intense period during which everyone workedtogether towards the goals of NATO and EU membership, political conflictswere put aside and even personal sacrifices were made in terms of long workinghours, a ‘what now?’ attitude pervades. Numerous options are open: workingtowards greater security for the region through involvement in rephrasing theEU’s neighbourhood strategy is one; 92 working towards better and more integratedhomeland security standards in the region could be another. As thisvolume shows, both are important issues for the Nordic countries as well; theymight open the way for further Baltic–Nordic security cooperation that wouldalso include Central Europe. However, the prerequisite is that the Baltic statesproperly define their place in the ESDP and NATO. The integration process isnot possible without head-on discussion of priorities: economic, social, environmentaland military. Since the ESDP’s hard capabilities will develop furtherand the Baltic states will be drawn further into its workings, the assumption thatthreats travel faster over short distances than long must be scrutinized throughpublic debate. That will naturally lead to discussion of future ESDP operationsand their directions: failed or failing states in Africa, or states closer to theBaltic states’ borders in the CIS and the Caucasus. Beyond that, however, is theneed for recognition in the respective Baltic societies that national sovereigntyis increasingly becoming a chimera. A fully fledged Baltic engagement in theESDP with backing from the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian publics is notpossible without a public debate on the countries’ geo-strategic priorities: conductedboth internally and together with the Nordic and other EU partners.The Baltic perception is that the USA is the partner most open to discussingtheir hard security fears, to listening and to understanding. Most outside analysesthat address Baltic security concerns are prepared by US institutes. TheRAND Corporation, as an example, undertook a study on assuring access to key92 The European Neighbourhood Policy was first outlined by the European Commission in Mar. 2003.See the website of the European Neighbourhood Policy at URL .