The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

226 THE BROADER DIMENSIONS OF SECURITYMoldova and Trans-Dniester demonstrate how the EU has had to switchbetween the three models. In other words, in these cases it has not been successfulin creating the original outcome for which it aimed. When Cyprus appliedfor membership of the EU, the Union’s mediation behaviour followed the trackof the first model: conflict settlement and reunification were required beforeaccession. At the Helsinki summit in December 1999, the EU switched from thefirst model to the second. The outcome of the process, however, suggests thatthe EU came close to the third model with Turkish Cyprus, creating a sub-stateentity that is virtually EU territory. In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, theEU again strongly advocated the single, common state solution; Solana usedforceful mediation tactics, and a settlement was achieved. However, a realtransformation of the conflict has not taken place and the state is dysfunctionalin many areas. In Trans-Dniester the EU geared the discussions towards a onestatesolution. It offered very few incentives for the parties, however, until 2003when Moldova was included as a first candidate for the new EuropeanNeighbourhood Policy. The Trans-Dniester authorities, on the other hand, havebeen isolated from these discussions. The EU has thus switched its policy to thesecond model. 37The case of the Middle East and of the EU’s first special representative thereis particularly interesting, because it shows clearly some of the difficulties thatthe EU’s mediation attempts have faced. Miguel Ángel Moratinos wasappointed the EU’s Special Envoy (as the EU special representative was thencalled) for the Middle East peace process on 25 November 1996. His mandatewas to establish close contact with all the parties concerned, first and foremostwith the Israelis and Palestinians but also with others in the region, and to contributetowards peace. Moratinos’s appointment was thought to add a politicaldimension to the Union’s economic weight in the Middle East.Although the formulation of Moratinos’s mandate did not mention the EU’squest for a role as a mediator in the bilateral negotiations, that option was notruled out. Despite the intention of the EU special representative system to providejoint representation and a means of action for the EU in different regions,the EU as a foreign policy actor is composed of member states that have differentinterests and, to a certain extent, different values. In handling serious politicalcrises, especially those involving armed conflict, the Union has faced difficultiesin acting as one. The EU and its member states have had differentviews on the Middle East conflict and it has been difficult to harmonize themember states’ stances. Moratinos’s mandate was a compromise between theFrench ambition to offer an alternative to US mediation and the German positionthat the USA is the leading third party with whom the EU should work inclose collaboration. There was also strong criticism aimed at Moratinos’s wayof working: some of the member countries saw him as a headstrong and forcefulactor who did not supply all member states with the required informationconcerning the Middle East conflict. There were also tensions in relations37 Emerson (note 36), pp. 85–90.