Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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90 <strong>Wellbeing</strong>, <strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
why is human diversity given so much importance in the capability<br />
literature? (Section 3.5) What does the notion ‘collective capability’ refer<br />
to? (Section 3.6) Which notion of wellbeing does the capability approach<br />
give us? (Section 3.7) How does the capability approach differ from the<br />
happiness approach, <strong>and</strong> what are the reasons that capability scholars do<br />
not adopt the happiness approach? (Section 3.8) To what extent — <strong>and</strong><br />
how — can the capability approach deal with adaptive preferences?<br />
(Section 3.9) Can a capability theory also be an explanatory theory, or is<br />
that not possible? (Section 3.10) Can the capability approach be used to<br />
study all normative questions, or is it not a suitable framework for some<br />
normative questions? (Section 3.11) <strong>The</strong> capability approach is often<br />
positioned as an alternative for resourcist theories — but what exactly<br />
is the role of resources in the capability approach? (Section 3.12) Finally,<br />
we consider how the capability approach relates to two established<br />
literatures: theories of justice <strong>and</strong> theories of human rights. Which<br />
choices in module B <strong>and</strong> module C are needed in order to construct a<br />
capability theory of justice? (Section 3.13) And how do capabilities <strong>and</strong><br />
human rights relate to each other? (Section 3.14)<br />
<br />
<strong>and</strong> ‘functioning’<br />
While at a very introductory level, the terms ‘functionings’ <strong>and</strong><br />
‘capability’ seem to be easy <strong>and</strong> straightforward, the terminology<br />
used in the literature is, alas, not always clear. <strong>The</strong>re has been quite<br />
considerable confusion in the use of the terminology, although — if one<br />
takes a meta-disciplinary helicopter view — it is possible to discern that<br />
particular uses of certain terms are more dominant than others. <strong>The</strong><br />
confusion has several sources. First, Amartya Sen <strong>and</strong> Martha Nussbaum<br />
have used the same terminology somewhat differently to each other,<br />
<strong>and</strong> since most capability scholars are more influenced either by Sen<br />
or by Nussbaum, its use in the wider literature is not st<strong>and</strong>ardised.<br />
Moreover, both Sen <strong>and</strong> Nussbaum have changed their use over time,<br />
without always making this explicit. Thirdly, there are differences in<br />
terminological choices that can be traced back to established differences<br />
in different disciplines, which are having their effect on the different<br />
disciplinary streams in the capability literature.