Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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168 <strong>Wellbeing</strong>, <strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
various practices in which human rights are used (creating laws, making<br />
policy <strong>and</strong> activism) a capability-based human rights framework can<br />
therefore never replace the existing human rights framework.<br />
However, there is, of course, a more fruitful relationship possible,<br />
<strong>and</strong> that is to see the two frameworks as complementary rather than<br />
competitive (Nussbaum 2011a). Note, however, that any merging of<br />
the two frameworks has to be between a particular capability theory<br />
<strong>and</strong> human rights thinking, rather than between the general capability<br />
approach <strong>and</strong> human rights thinking. 31 A good example of such<br />
practical work is the UK’s Equality <strong>and</strong> Human Rights Framework.<br />
Tania Burchardt <strong>and</strong> Polly Vizard (2011) used insights from both the<br />
capability approach <strong>and</strong> the existing work on human rights to create a<br />
framework that is used for the monitoring undertaken by the Equality<br />
<strong>and</strong> Human Rights Commission in order to meet its legal m<strong>and</strong>ate. 32<br />
<br />
<strong>The</strong> aim of this chapter has been to deepen our underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the<br />
capability approach, by analysing some questions of clarification<br />
that are often posed, <strong>and</strong> by reconstructing <strong>and</strong> synthesizing some<br />
developments that have taken place in the capability literature over<br />
time.<br />
<strong>The</strong> next chapter will focus on a range of critiques that have been<br />
put to the capability approach. Of course, it is not always entirely clear<br />
whether a certain question or debate is purely a matter of clarification,<br />
or rather a matter of debate <strong>and</strong> dispute; put differently, there is no neat<br />
demarcation between the main focus of this chapter <strong>and</strong> that of the next.<br />
Still, in this chapter I have tried to be as neutral <strong>and</strong> even-h<strong>and</strong>ed as<br />
possible in describing the literature, whereas in the next chapter I will<br />
take a more active role in arguing for or against certain views or claims.<br />
31 Hence, when Nussbaum (2011a, 24) writes “the CA is a type of human rights<br />
approach”, we should read this as “Martha Nussbaum’s capability theory is a<br />
type of human rights approach”. Many other capability theories are, evidently, not<br />
human rights approaches, <strong>and</strong> hence the capability approach, as the overarching<br />
framework, cannot be either.<br />
32 See https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en