Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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3. Clarifications<br />
135<br />
interventions (Cummins et al. 2003). <strong>The</strong> effect of one policy measure<br />
such as improved child care facilities will be reflected hardly or not at all<br />
in reported overall life satisfaction, even if such policies have significant<br />
effects on the real opportunities of parents to organise their lives as they<br />
think best — hence on their capabilities. Overall ‘happy life expectancy’<br />
is, by contrast, well-suited for comparing the effects of fundamental<br />
political <strong>and</strong> economic institutions on subjective wellbeing. This<br />
emerges clearly from the work of Veenhoven (1996), which concentrates<br />
on studies whereby the unit of analysis is the country. In other words,<br />
Veenhoven mainly uses happy life expectancy as an indicator for macroanalysis.<br />
<strong>The</strong> variables that emerge as the determinants of happy life<br />
expectancy are therefore typically system variables such as the degree<br />
of political freedom, or the presence of rule of law. But the quality<br />
of life in a micro-situation (say, living in a particular community or<br />
neighbourhood) is also influenced by many other variables.<br />
<br />
<strong>The</strong> previous sections argued that happiness can’t be taken to represent<br />
a person’s wellbeing for many purposes, including policy purposes. Yet<br />
it would also be deeply counter-intuitive to say that happiness doesn’t<br />
matter at all. It may be the right concept of wellbeing for other aims.<br />
How, then, can happiness be given a proper place within the capability<br />
approach?<br />
<strong>The</strong> first possibility is to see happiness, or some more specific<br />
capabilities that are closely related to the affective component of<br />
subjective wellbeing, as one important dimension to be selected. In fact,<br />
Amartya Sen has for many years argued that we could take ‘feeling<br />
happy’ as one of the functionings to be selected. For example, Sen (2008,<br />
26) wrote:<br />
happiness, however, is extremely important, since being happy is a<br />
momentous achievement in itself. Happiness cannot be the only thing<br />
that we have reason to value, nor the only metric for measuring other<br />
things that we value, but on its own, happiness is an important human<br />
functioning. <strong>The</strong> capability to be happy is, similarly, a major aspect of<br />
the freedom that we have good reason to treasure. <strong>The</strong> perspective of<br />
happiness illuminates one critically important element of human living.