Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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3. Clarifications<br />
141<br />
not be as widespread as some capability theorists make it out to be: “the<br />
available evidence only provides limited support for the adaptation<br />
argument <strong>and</strong> is not always easy to interpret”. Given the “occupational<br />
hazards” that those trying to identify adaptive preferences face (Khader<br />
2011, 55–60), it is important not to ‘see’ adaptive preferences where<br />
there are none. In conclusion, the capability scholar will have to balance<br />
the tricky tasks of neither ignoring processes of adaption, nor making<br />
the adaptation problem bigger than it really is.<br />
This brings us to the last question: can the capability approach deal<br />
with these issues? Given that capability theories <strong>and</strong> applications can<br />
be very diverse, we will need different methods to h<strong>and</strong>le the issue of<br />
adaptive preferences for different capability theories <strong>and</strong> applications.<br />
In the context of action-research, small-scale projects <strong>and</strong> grassroots<br />
strategies, what is required above all is deliberation <strong>and</strong> interaction with<br />
people of whom one may be worried that their preferences may show<br />
signs of adaption, as exemplified by Ina Conradie in her project with<br />
women in a South African township (Conradie 2013; Conradie <strong>and</strong><br />
Robeyns 2013). Khader (2011) has developed ‘a deliberative perfectionist<br />
approach to adaptive preference intervention’, in which a practitioner<br />
who suspects that a group of people has adaptive preferences will first<br />
attempt to underst<strong>and</strong> how the suspected preferences affect their basic<br />
flourishing. This must be done via deliberative processes — a strategy<br />
that we also see in Conradie’s research. If the practitioner has good<br />
reasons to suspect that some of the preferences are adapted, she can<br />
involve those with the alleged adaptive preference in a discussion <strong>and</strong><br />
together search for a strategy for change. Note that there is an interesting<br />
parallel here with the grassroots-based development model that has<br />
been proposed by Solava Ibrahim (2017), in which ‘a conscientization<br />
process’ is an integral part of the development process. In this process,<br />
a person reflects critically on her life, develops aspirations for better<br />
living conditions, <strong>and</strong> makes a plan of action to bring about the<br />
desired change (Ibrahim 2017, 206). While, as Ibrahim rightly notes,<br />
adaptive preferences <strong>and</strong> aspirations may provide a challenge for this<br />
conscientization process, they are also very likely to be challenged <strong>and</strong><br />
hence changed via such a process.<br />
What about capability applications that involve the empirical analysis<br />
of large-scale datasets? How can adaptation be dealt with in those<br />
applications? Here, the capability approach needs to use insights from