Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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66 <strong>Wellbeing</strong>, <strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
In sum, structural constraints can have a very important role in<br />
shaping people’s capability sets, <strong>and</strong> therefore have to be part of<br />
capability theories. Structural constraints vary depending on one’s<br />
caste, class, ethnicity, age, gender, sexual orientation, (dis)abilities, <strong>and</strong><br />
the economic system in which one lives. <strong>The</strong>se structural constraints<br />
are very likely to have an influence on a person’s capability set (<strong>and</strong> in<br />
most cases also do have that influence). Having an account of structural<br />
constraints is therefore non-optional: every capability theory has one,<br />
although sometimes this account will be very implicit. For example, I<br />
will argue in section 4.10 that part of the critique of mainstream welfare<br />
economics is that it has a very weak or minimal account of structural<br />
constraints. Heterodox welfare economists who are embracing the<br />
capability approach are not only doing so because they think the<br />
endorsement of the capability account of wellbeing is better than the<br />
preferences-based accounts that are dominant in mainstream economics,<br />
but often also because they hope that the minimal account of structural<br />
constraints in welfare economics can be replaced by a richer account<br />
that is better informed by insights from the other social sciences <strong>and</strong><br />
from the humanities.<br />
<br />
capabilities, or both<br />
In developing a capability theory, we need to decide whether we think<br />
that what matters are capabilities, functionings, or a combination of<br />
both. <strong>The</strong> core proposition that functionings <strong>and</strong> capabilities form<br />
the evaluative space (A5), was not decisive regarding the question of<br />
whether it is only functionings, or only capabilities, or a mixture of both,<br />
that form this space.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re are various arguments given in the literature defending a<br />
range of views that only capabilities matter; or that primarily secured<br />
functionings matter; or that for particular capability theories it is<br />
impossible only to focus on capabilities; or that we sometimes have good<br />
reasons to focus on functionings. <strong>The</strong>se various claims <strong>and</strong> arguments<br />
will be reviewed in section 3.4; as will be argued in that section, there<br />
are good reasons why people could reasonably disagree on whether the<br />
capability analysis they are conducting should focus on functionings or