Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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64 <strong>Wellbeing</strong>, <strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
terms of her own values <strong>and</strong> objectives, whether or not we assess them<br />
in terms of some external criteria as well” (Sen 1999a, 19).<br />
Applications of the capability approach should endorse some account<br />
of agency, except if there are good reasons why agency should be taken<br />
to be absent, or why in a particular capability application agency is<br />
simply not relevant (for example, when one wants to investigate the<br />
correlation between an income metric <strong>and</strong> some achieved functionings).<br />
But clearly, as with other key ethical concepts such as ‘wellbeing’ or<br />
‘freedom’, the concept of ‘agency’ can be fleshed out in many different<br />
ways. <strong>The</strong> capability approach is not committed to one particular account<br />
of agency. Similar to the acknowledgement of structural constraints,<br />
there is no agreed-upon or st<strong>and</strong>ard claim about how much agency, or<br />
what particular type, should be assumed; the claim is minimalistic in<br />
the sense that, as with the structural constraints which will be discussed<br />
in the next section, agency cannot simply be ignored <strong>and</strong> must be<br />
accounted for. One can give agency a key role in a capability theory (e.g.<br />
Crocker 2008; Claassen 2016) or a more restricted role, perhaps also using<br />
different terminology. One can also develop the account of agency by<br />
spelling out some of its preconditions, which may include capabilities.<br />
For example, Tom de Herdt (2008) analysed the capability of not<br />
having to be subjected to public shame as a precondition of agency, <strong>and</strong><br />
showed how this may be relevant for social policymaking by illustrating<br />
its importance in a food relief programme in Kinshasa. For empirical<br />
scholars <strong>and</strong> policy scholars, an empirically sound account of agency<br />
will be crucial; for moral philosophers, a more theoretical account of<br />
what conceptualisation of agency is morally relevant will be needed.<br />
Thus, the precise content of this B-module will differ significantly<br />
between different capability theories <strong>and</strong> applications — but, in all<br />
cases, some acknowledgement of agency will be needed. 37<br />
37 Martha Nussbaum explicitly refrains from integrating the notion of ‘agency’ in her<br />
capability theory (Nussbaum 2000, 14). However, this does not mean that there isn’t<br />
an account of agency in her theory, since the inclusion of the capability of practical<br />
reason on her list of central human capabilities can be understood as corresponding<br />
to one particular conceptualisation of agency.